524 /65 cont./
child" or "married couple." In the latter game sexual activity
524 is already often involved. As long as the children have not yet
864 reached puberty, the adults laugh about it. It is only the mothers of girls who are a little annoyed when they hear about it. They do not regard it as tragic, however, since they themselves were reprimanded about it by their mothers when they were little girls.

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582 g) Marriage

At the age of 7-8 a girl as a rule has already been given in
585 marriage. The husband is usually 8-10 years older. They do not as yet lead a regular married life, however. During the day the little girl plays with other children, and only at night does she sleep
[833] in her hammock beside her husband. Sexual intercourse, however,
[593] is strictly forbidden until after the second menstruation. She also fetches firewood and water and receives prepared food for herself
[484] and her husband from her family. When the tribe is on the march, she carries the hammock of her spouse and the few household articles. Economic reasons are connected with this marriage in childhood, for the young husband must hunt for his little wife and
606 her parents. Especially noteworthy is the reserve toward in-laws which operate in such a way that son-in-law and mother-in-law never
582 speak to each other and may not visit each other. Since the fear of incest is very great in both tribes, a marriage, which is always agreed upon by the parents, may be entered into only by partners who are not related by kinship. For this reason young wives are preferably obtained from a friendly tribe; in this case, however, the young man must live there until his wife has put her second
583 menstruation behind her. Occasionally young girls and women are abducted from hostile tribes. They are first held as captives and prostitutes for some time, however, before a man may finally marry them. I met such a little female captive among the Surára. She came from the hostile tribe of the Karanaterí and was approximately 15 or 16 years old.

Makiritare SS 20

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648 /190 cont./ scorn them, and, at first sight, they seemed to be unworried, but the knowledge that they no longer live alone in the land of their fathers, and the fact of having heard that four days prior to our arrival /191/ at the conuco an Indian who had sought refuge by climbing a tree was shot by a Sanemá arrow and fell lifeless into the river, constantly tortured them.

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[186] A powerful stimulus which always encouraged the Makiritare on their numerous trips was to get a wife among their neighbors of the same tribe. Nowadays, despite the intense scorn which the Makiritare profess toward the Yanoama, taking a wife from that tribe is not considered an impossible or degrading thing: there are many Yanoama women who have married Makiritare men (cf. Grelier, 1955b, p. 10). This matrimonial interchange inevitably carries with it an assimilation of cultures between the two tribes, a process in which the Makiritare cultural pattern will dominate that of the Yanoama and the Yanoama genes will infiltrate the Makiritare gene pool. There is not the least doubt but that the Sanemá, who were brought in for a short time, arrived at the upper Ventuari and Caura where they took up residence to stay, and that the present fusion between the Caribe and the Yanoama ought not to be explained so much by the good will of the former as by the vitality of the latter.

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101 The Waica subtribe occupies the central part of the present Yanoama territory, that of the upper Orinoco and its tributaries above the mouth of the Ocamo, including also the southern bank of the river (Barker, 1953, p. 434). As we have already mentioned, they appear to live also in the general arc of the upper Rio Branco and its western tributaries, and Schuster (1958, p. 114) is very probably right when he says that the Sierra Parima does not bound the Waica zone, but that it extends to Brazilian territory.

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797 We have already mentioned the first contacts which the Whites had with the Waica, and, after a somewhat unfruitful effort by Hamilton Rice at the beginning of the present century, the Waica world went without contact with science until the New Tribes Mission was able to start peaceful relations with the Waica through the missionary James Paul Barker. Some ethnographic data were also published on this Yanoama subtribe by several

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594 family exists as a definite cell in that tribe, assuming all the
621 functions and all the specific responsibilities of that social entity. Thus, there exists the formal arrangement of marriage, which sanctions sexual contact between the spouses and guarantees procreation. There exists economic co-operation among the members of the nuclear family, which organizes work and apportions the necessary subsistance and, in this way, injects persistence in the family's living together. There are [86] practically no tasks which exceed the capacity of the nuclear family and the children learn the way of life directly from their parents and elders.

594 The most visible center of the nuclear family is the fire
354 around which they eat and sleep. From here they go out to their work and, upon their return, reassemble at the fireside. After a long trip, the man takes the small sticks from his quiver and makes a fire; there is a new fire; a new home is established.

596 Each individual Sanemá belongs also to an extended family
621 made up according to the residence rules already explained. The local group /211/ consists of two or more of these extended families of the same bilateral kinsfolk and form /sic/ a band. This local group or band is the largest social unit to which [619] a Sanemá belongs. The terms "subtribe" and "tribe" which we use are artificial terms lacking in real meaning for the Sanemá. But the band is definitely a familiar concept for him, one which he knows very well and with which he identifies. The band guarantees economic and social stability, and its well-being benefits the individual member, who feels tied to it by a multitude of family ties.

621 Each local group has innumerable enemies, while the circle
628 of friends is extremely small. Contact between all of one group with a neighboring group is rare, but does sometimes occur. They sometimes get together for commercial reasons or at funeral ceremonies, but their friendship is weak and unstable.

601 We were unable, for lack of an informant, to obtain a list of
● 582 kinship terms. Our impression is that a Hawaiian system is involved.
600 One may not marry a female cross or parallel cousin. There are

Waica,[9] there seems to be a strong tendency towards bilocality. Although bilocal extended families are relatively rare,[10] their existence among the semi-nomadic Yanomama could very well be possible, since there do not exist any decisive economic factors which could strongly favor unilocal residence. Among the Sanemá of the Casara (incipient agriculturists) we have observed initial matrilocal with subsequent patrilocal residence and a rather formal initiation of common residence of the spouses. Polygyny is permitted and young girls are frequently married to men even before their first menstruation. The kinship system is of the Hawaiian type.

Local groups follow the suggestions of a headman in peacetime and receive orders from a war chief in wartime. There appear to exist at least two and possibly three different religious-medical practitioners among some of the subtribes, who (*hāwiawan*) represent their community at the court of a deified Culture Hero, who (*sabli*) regulate the groups' relationship to a host of animal and plant spirits, and who (*kāilala*) cure physical ailments of mainly non-supernatural origin.[11] The *sabli* (shaboliwa) seems to be the most important practitioner of the Waica, among whom the *hāwiawan* has not been observed.

Physical appearance. Two authors have recently reported on the occurrence of a great phenotypical variation among the Sanemá (Samatari)[12] and among the Waica.[13] They mention four different types with more or less specific physical features:

a. A minority pygmoid type with a general stature of less than 130 cm, light skin, fine-cut faces with a gay expression, small hands and small feet.
b. Relatively tall type, dark skinned, robust, erect, and with a wild facial expression.
c. Type of medium stature, round-headed, with a feminine expression, small nose, small mouth, and yellowish clay-colored skin. Some individuals have wavy hair and brown instead of black eyes.
d. "Mongoloid" and "semi-Tartaric" type with almond-shaped eyes, frowning expression, protruding forehead and pointed chin, thin beard, slim, and of medium stature.

We shall return to this observation in a later chapter.

9 Barker, 1971, p. 478.
10 Murdock, 1949, p. 35.
11 Wilbert, 1981a.
12 Vinal, 1956, pp. 124-125.
13 Zerries, 1959.

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582 [163] Girls are usually around 14 or 15 years of age when they have their first child. The husband is perhaps between 16 and 18 years of age, if this is his first marriage.

The adult men frequently take as new wives girls who have just reached puberty.

A boy 15 years old is commonly not considered capable of taking a wife, especially if he has not yet sown his first conuco /a clearing for cultivation/ in order to be able to feed his wife. But even if the planting had been prepared, it is often the case that he has to wait while the older men pick over the girls whom he might have wished to marry.

584 582 Nevertheless, in marriages prearranged with the consent of all before the husband and the wife are of age, it is very probable that the age of both would be almost the same. As a result a boy might marry at an age younger than usual.

162 163 Here are some examples of the number of living children per wife among Guaika families. The parentheses indicate the probability that no more children will be born. (Not all of the fathers of the families enumerated are still alive.)

Living children of families of a single wife:

(6) (5) (4) (4) (4) (3) (3) 5 4 4 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0

Living children of polygamous families and families in which a second wife has been taken after the death of the first:

	First Wife	Other Wives
Family "A"	(12)	1
Family "B"	6	2 -- 1 -- 1
Family "C"	(4)	2
Family "D"	(3)	4
Family "E"	2	0

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Communications

202 195 Messages are memorized and carried by a messenger.

All official messages are communicated to the messenger and transmitted by him in a crooned form to the addressee. The addressee of the message repeats the words which are communicated to him or responds by answering them.

582 /477/ A young woman cannot remain unmarried for a long time, but some manage to reject all their suitors for several years 587 after puberty. A widow, especially a widow with children, sometimes remains alone forever after the death of her husband.

Making Peace

628 202 When one settlement wishes closer friendship with another, it sends a messenger to offer more friendly terms.

628 202 728 If the settlements are only "macana enemies," a messenger of the very settlement that takes the initiative might go, but if the settlements are "arrow enemies," then it is necessary to send a messenger from a settlement which is friendly with both of the settlements in question. The messenger who is a member of a settlement that is an "arrow enemy" would run the danger of being shot with an arrow before giving the message.

628 728 Thus, two very hostile settlements might manage to suspend the raids between them. Later, they might agree not to fight any more should they see one another in a friendly settlement. Until they arrive at this accord, a neutral settlement friendly to both, when it is visited by people from one of these settlements hostile to each other, must send a message to the other, warning that they should not come so long as there are visitors from the hostile settlement in it. Still later they might agree to receive the visit of a small group of visitors from the other [579] enemy settlement, for commercial purposes. From this time on the two settlements can undertake their negotiations directly, and friendships begin to form among their respective members. [582] Then, when one settlement, out of good will, gives its own girls as wives to the men of the other settlement, it can be said that they have recovered; they have truly become good friends.

While the greater the number of persons involved in a dispute or a fight, the less the probability that the opposing bands will reach an understanding after a short time, the disputes within a settlement itself are in general settled quickly. Within a few months all will have been forgotten. /478/ Disputes between settlements which have not gone beyond macana fights are usually forgotten in a year or two. Disputes between settlements which have occasion to use arrows, especially if someone has

[Introductory, P. iii;]

Genealogical data in both sociological and demographical form are given for one small village to demonstrate the dual organization tendency. Similar data on two other villages from which this sample village recently split are presented to show that affinal ties between local descent groups are structurally more stable than agnatic ties between such groups, and that these affinal ties hold local descent groups together when larger villages fragment, resulting in the break-up of lineages and the redistribution of their members into mutually hostile, independent villages.

The intensity and tactics of warfare are shown to determine in large measure both the size of the village and the political conditions that promote inter-village alliances based on marriage. Finally, the techniques of slash-and-burn horticulture are discussed to show how economic dependence on cultivated food promotes the establishment of political alliances based on marriage exchanges and determines the direction of movement of relocated villages.

Three conclusions are drawn from the analysis. First, the frequency of intra-village fighting and inter-village warfare co-varies with the frequency with which males may legitimately satisfy sexual desires; anything that increases female/male ratio or the sexual activity of females reduces feuding. Second, the degree to which marriage practice conforms to marriage rules is predictable once the conditions of warfare are specified. When warfare is chronic, alliances between historically unrelated villages require a breach of marriage rules when women pass between these groups. Comparative data on Brazilian Yanomamö social organization are given to support these conclusions. Third, the data bearing on Yanomamö social organization support E. R. Leach's contention that the political and economic contexts within which marriages take place must be considered as part of the ongoing social organization and must be included in analyses of the latter. By so doing, the analysis shows that integration between Yanomamö lineal descent corporations does not necessarily derive from inherent properties agnatic kinship as argued by Meyer Fortes.

10:Chagnon B-4.5 (1964-1966) 1967 SQ18 Yanoama SQ18

INTRODUCTION

A. Statement of Thesis

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This is a functional study of one form of marriage practiced by the Yanomamö Indians of southern Venezuela. The form of marriage considered here--recruitment of wives from other villages for the purpose of initiating and maintaining political alliances--constitutes a departure by the Yanomamö from their preferred form of marriage. I wish to emphasize the point that these marriages constitute a predictable and necessary departure from the ambilateral cross-cousin preferences. I will show in the space below how a number of variables are related to each other to bring about the exceptional marriages.

The fact that normative rules of behavior and actual behavior differ considerably from each other in most societies has received little theoretical attention, particular in regard to analyses of marriage systems. For the most part we presume that exceptions to stated marriage preferences represent a measure of the breakdown of the society under consideration, due to contacts with other societies. Yanomamö exceptional marriages[1] cannot be dismissed with this line of

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[1] Of 56 recently contracted marriages in three of the villages investigated, 31 cases were breaches of the preferred ambilateral cross-cousin marriage rules for the purpose of establishing political ties between the groups of the spouses.

reasoning, as most of the Yąnomamö villages are presently uncontacted, and those that are in contact with foreigners have only recently (since 1951) entered into these contacts.

Yąnomamö marriages, even the preferred form, are influenced by the milieu of inter-village hostility within which they are contracted. Marriages in this milieu have as their major function the promotion of social ties between the descent groups represented in the exchange and are best understood as the deployment of women between groups with the purpose of promoting political and military alliances. The groups in question may be of two kinds: the local patrilineages comprising a particular village, or the members of different villages as such. As the only corporate group among the Yąnomamö is the local lineage, marriages within and between villages are to be understood as alliances between different corporate groups.[1]

The variables affecting marriage practice--weakness of descent as a solidarity-promoting medium, village size and instability, the chronic nature of warfare, the shortage of women, attitudes about aggressiveness and demonstration of ferocity by individuals, and economic practices--are such that some deviation from the normative marriage rules is necessary to insure maximum survival chances for the residents of the various autonomous villages. Because marriage exchanges in general have political and military implications,

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[1] Yąnomamö villages are not corporate groups.

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actual marriage practices reflect the immediate political and military needs of a given village. If it is more advantageous to dispose of a woman in a way that promotes greater solidarity between allies, the marriage rule is not followed.[1] An eligible female, therefore, is given to a man (perhaps unrelated) in another village if her kinsmen have reason to believe that they may be required to take refuge in or request military aid from that other village.

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An ally's demands are not to be taken lightly, for to fail in an obligation to an ally may have the gravest consequences for survival; one tactic of Yanomamö warfare is invitations to feasts during which a disgruntled group kills the male guests and seizes their women. These treacherous feasts (nomohoni) occur often enough, so that local groups

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are always suspicious of their allies. A dependable ally is won at the expense of women. Failure to hand over enough women creates a frustrated ally who is extremely dangerous. Yanomamö political behavior has largely to do with disposing of enough women to make the ally loyal, but not to give more women than is necessary to achieve this end; miscalculation in this respect has serious consequences. As it is imperative for local groups, for reasons to be outlined below, to have allies, it is likewise necessary for them to enter into marriage exchanges with other groups.

[1] When women are given to men from other villages, the men rarely, if ever, are related to them as Fališo or Mošrišo. The exchange of women for purposes of alliance usually establishes the initial kinship ties between the groups of the wife receivers and wife givers.

attain a certain size; beyond this point the causes of internal fighting are too numerous for peace to be maintained effectively by kinship ties, and the village breaks up into smaller, more cohesive units. This affects the degree to which deviations from the marriage norm occur: first, the female cross-cousins of an eligible bachelor are usually in villages that are hostile to his own, and he is obliged to seek a spouse in another, currently friendly, village. Secondly, as his own village is now more vulnerable because of its small size, some of its eligible females must be given to men in other villages in order to promote military alliances.

Village size and demography

The significance of demographic data has only recently received recognition in analyses of social systems. The importance of such data in the analysis of marriage practices has been most tellingly illustrated by F. G. Rose's study of the Groote Eylandt Aborigines (1960). Rose was able to show that where men marry women who are considerably younger than themselves, two important consequences follow: primary marriages with father's sister's daughter is effectively prevented, as is the practice of sister exchange.

Similarly, Ackerman (1964), in a critique of Needham's analysis of Purum marriage, showed that demography-dependent data such as frequency of 'marriage acts' (ibid., p. 60) do not support Needham's contention that the Purum

121 have a prescriptive marriage system. What the Purum say they do and what they actually do are two distinct things.

621 573 922 As I mentioned above, after Yanomamö villages reach a certain, critical size, they tend to fragment into smaller groups. The internal tensions that promote this instability are to some extent offset by external military pressures: members of a faction within a larger village may want to establish their own independent village to avoid club-fighting and to suppress more severe forms of violence; but if their village is being raided by members of other villages, it may be impossible for them to do so. Occasionally a [241] village splits into several factions, each establishing its own garden apart from the other, but the factions are forced to reunite because of raids mounted by other groups. Generally, the process of village splitting precludes a later recombination of the same factions because these remain hostile to each other. Thus, the small, vulnerable villages that result from the fragmentation of a larger village are constrained to make marriage alliances with other villages, both to insure military assistance and because it is difficult to obtain women from their kinsmen with whom they are now at war. Village size and the balance of marriage exchanges between villages indicate that numerically weak villages are coerced by their stronger partners to give up women. In some cases, the disposition of desirable trade goods may affect the balance in the exchange of women between two villages. In general it may be said that, when one village

is allied to another which can provide it with more military assistance and desirable trade goods than the former can give to the latter, an imbalance in the exchanges of women will follow. The imbalance will favor the village that, for reasons of size and of existing military patterns, least needs the military aid of the other.

The character of Yanomamö warfare is not as intimately related to village size as might be expected, although, of course, larger villages are best able to conduct warfare successfully over a long period of time from one location. Larger villages are less likely to be forced to abandon their location because of raids from smaller groups, whereas smaller groups are markedly vulnerable in this respect. Nevertheless, no one village is large enough to withstand successfully military pressures from a cluster of smaller, allied villages, and, therefore, the members of all villages seek defensive alliances with their neighbors. Such alliances are based on the exchange of women.

Other demographic factors, in addition to sheer size of villages, affect marriage practices. The ratio of males to females, for example, is high, partly because of the practice of female infanticide. Moreover, the shortage of women is compounded by other factors; sexual intercourse is prohibited with pregnant women and those who have nursing children, and polygyny causes an unequal distribution of the available women. It would be difficult to exaggerate the consequences for Yanomamö social organization of this single

phenomenon: the feuds that lead to the splitting of villages and the cause of fighting between villages are largely the result of the shortage of women.

Within villages, then, the bachelors and those men whose wives are either pregnant or are nursing children constantly threaten village stability by seeking liaisons with the wives of other men. The discovery of these liaisons usually leads to violent fighting between the group of close relatives of the woman's husband and that of her lover; and this frequently causes the village to split. The larger the village, the more likely it is that such liaisons will develop and that the subsequent fighting will lead to fragmentation of the village.

Village size, then, is limited by the capacity of the kinship network to regulate internal feuds, and by the nature of the actual or current warfare pattern of the neighboring villages. As the village grows in size, the incidence of extra-marital affairs and club-fights appears to increase, while the ability of kinship to regulate the affairs of a multi-lineage village diminishes in proportion. Villages then split into smaller groups that comprise two or more small, cohesive, intermarrying local lineages; each group establishes an independent village and enters into marriage alliances with other villages. The prior existence of hostilities with other villages may delay the split, but does not prevent it. In short, the relationship of Yanomamö village size to village solidarity nicely illustrates Leslie

*621 White's generalization that

> every society tends to behave in such a way as to achieve that balance between size and solidarity that will give it the maximum effectiveness in carrying on its life-sustaining activities. (1959:104)

Belligerent ideology and aggressive behavior

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Village size plays an important role in the nature of the political relationships between groups that are not linked by kinship ties. As mentioned above, larger villages tend to use their strength and dominance to upset the exchange balance of women. But the degree to which a powerful group is able to force a dependent ally to cede women is limited by the ability of the smaller group to raid the larger village successfully. In ideological terms the Yanomamö express this capacity to wage war by placing emphasis on and valuing aggressive behavior. It is considered both proper and desirable to act ferociously, as this informs neighbors of the group's capacity to wage war and warns them that the group is willing to resort to war in political dealings.

*611 *623 721 152 181

*621 *623 524 571 152

Members of small villages are consequently constrained to behave militantly toward larger neighbors to limit the coercion that the larger group may be tempted to try. Their fierce behavior takes the form of threat, bluff, chicanery in trading and, most important, challenges to duels. Frequently, when villagers are invited to feast with an allied group, the invitation includes a challenge to a chest-pounding

duel. Such a duel functions to remind the allies that the host is strong and willing to display his strength to protect his sovereignty.

The practical effect of this kind of behavior is that the solidarity of political alliances is constantly threatened. Allies are always suspicious of each other's intentions, and political ties between them are tenuous.

Although the giving of women in marriage between allies serves to promote solidarity, the capacity for marriage to achieve this end in itself is limited by the constant displays of hostility and aggressiveness by both groups.

The display of ferocity is manifest at the local, village level also. No insult is too slight to go unnoticed and unchallenged. Indeed, most individuals seize upon these opportunities to display strength. Thus, a legitimate way for men to display aggressiveness is for them to beat their errant wives, to burn them with fire brands, to cut their arms and legs with machetes or to shoot them in a non-vital part of the body with a barbed arrow. Men constantly intimidate their wives and respond cruelly to the slightest provocations, such as the wife's failure to act quickly on a husband's demand for food. Men who are brutal to their wives are feared and respected by other men, for the implication of this behavior is that the man will behave equally fiercely if insulted by another man.

Men often prefer to have a wife from another village, upon whom it is easier--and safer--to vent ferocity and

cruel actions; that is, the extent to which husbands are brutal to their wives is largely a function of the number of kinsmen the women have within the village, particularly brothers. Some men have even killed their wives in fits of rage, but in all the cases for which I have complete data, the women came from other villages and had no kinsmen in their husband's village to protect them. Conversely, when women have brothers within the village, their husbands exercise restraint in their treatment of them, knowing that the brothers of the women will use force to defend them. It is not unusual for a man to take his sister away from a cruel husband and to give her to someone else; this inevitably leads to club-fighting and frequently causes the village to split.

Ideological considerations, therefore, promote friction and fighting within villages and lead to village splits; and, the newly formed factions are obliged to seek marriage alliances with other groups.

Economic practices

Local groups abandon residential and horticultural sites only when forced to do so by the raiding pattern of their enemies. For the most part, the Yąnomamö are able to predict the hostilities that will force them to abandon their gardens, and they plan accordingly. The first act of a war is frequently the clearing of a new garden at some distance from the presently occupied site. If hostilities develop within the village and it is expected that these will

escalate, the factions involved usually use the interlude between a club-fight and actual killings to establish separate gardens.

Occasionally, however, a village suddenly becomes embroiled in a war that it has not expected, or fighting within the village immediately involves shooting to kill. Then the only recourse for the group is to take refuge with an ally and subsist on the produce of the ally's garden. If the critical situation develops out of an intra-village dispute, the smaller of the contesting factions is forced to flee to another village where it has friends or relatives.

If all the members of a village are forced to take refuge in another village, they proceed to make their own garden apart from that of their hosts; then, when the garden begins to produce, the refugee group moves to that site to live. They do this because the price of protection is always measurable in terms of the hosts' demanding access to the women of the guests, either as spouses for their own men or simply as temporary sexual partners.

Twice during the lifetime of my oldest Bisaasi-tedi informants their group was obliged to flee to an allied village to escape the raids of powerful neighbors, raids that resulted from the development of intensive hostilities before the group could establish a new garden of its own elsewhere. On both occasions the refugees lost a number of women to their protectors, and in neither case did they receive wives in return. Indeed, on the second occasion, the hosts planned

*628 726 574 to kill all the male guests and to abduct the women, but the hosts themselves unexpectedly became involved in a war and required the aid of their guests.

*628 24 722 361 Yąnomamö dependency on cultivated foods, then, promotes political alliances with other villages; the warfare pattern is such that the members of a village may have to flee from their site to avoid the raids of their enemies. If they have not had time to establish a new garden, they need the support of an ally until they are able to support themselves.

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121 583 582 The variables that affect Yąnomamö marriage practices are numerous and diverse and combine with each other in complex ways. I shall show in the chapters that follow how these variables actually affect Yąnomamö marriage practices. At this juncture the point to be made is that Yąnomamö social practice in real life can not be completely isomorphic with the stated marriage preferences because the milieu within which marriages take place simply precludes such a neat fit. A functional, rather than a structural analysis seems to be demanded by the nature of the variables in question. I shall also show the degree to which we can predict actual marriage behavior, given specific information about the variables.

[724] [182] Finally, I should add that the Yąnomamö constitute a significant case for ethnological inquiry: this society offers

1t:Chagnon S-4.5 (1964-1968) 1967 SQ18 Yanomama SQ18

121 us the opportunity to estimate the effects of warfare on the
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* 582 nature of marriage practices among a people who are chroni-
182 cally at war, a situation not frequently found in the present
724 ethnographic world.

123 B. The Data and Field Techniques

Several kinds of data are required to illustrate Yanomamö marriage practices and the variables affecting them. The most important data are those I obtained from genealogies and the historical relationships between villages.

In total, I have genealogical data on some 3,000 individuals, living and dead, from 15 villages. Not all the data are comparable in quality and I shall confine my discussion to the populations of the five villages for which
123 my data are most complete. These five villages fall into
*121 two groups with regard to their historical origins.
*622 Three of them have a common history, separating initially about 1943 at which time two villages were formed.[1] One of these split again about 1954 to form two villages, giving a total of 3 separate but closely related villages. The other two of the five selected for this study also have a common history, but are distinct from the first three. For purposes of clarity I will refer to these two villages as Shamatari (see Chapter 5 for discussion). About 1960 the two Shamatari villages split from each other and are presently on good terms.

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[1] See Chapter 5 for a discussion of the historical relationships of these villages.

847 [848] child: he had scrupulously observed the coitus taboo during lactation--the wife had not.

Most cases of infanticide take place when a couple already has a small child. Sickness takes a heavy toll during the early months of a child's life, and women are reluctant to jeopardize a child that has already survived the first two years. So, they frequently kill the new-born so that their older child will have no competition for milk. Bahimi, a woman of some 30 years, killed a new male baby shortly after I started my fieldwork in Bisasasi-tedi. She explained, tearfully, that she did not feel that she could successfully raise the new child because she still had a son that was nursing.

847 562 162 These cases do not, however, explain why there is a consistent bias to kill females rather than males. When I discovered how significantly the sex ratio diverged from the expected value of 1.0 in some villages, I tried to get an explanation from the Ypanoamö. I was surprised to find out that they were ignorant of their own bias in killing children. [892] What did come to light, however, was the fact that Ypanoamö prefer to have a male baby for their first child and, if it turns out that the first child is a girl, they will frequently kill her. If, however, a couple prefers to have a girl and the first child is a boy, they generally do not kill the boy.[1]

[114] [582] [1] Whatever the reason may be for the preference toward males as eldest children, there is one structural effect that deserves further enquiry. Rose (1960) effectively showed that where males tend to marry females that are younger than them-

847 562 162 Several kinds of demographic data suggest that the rate of female infanticide is high. Table 1 gives the sex ratios of five Yanomamö villages. The sex ratio for the total population sample (576 individuals) gives a more meaningful estimate of the rate of female infanticide, as there is considerable variation by village in the value of the sex ratio. The excess of males in the total population (8%) gives a first 562 approximation of the frequency of female infanticide. The 162 628 722 [583] variation in the sex ratio by the village, on the other hand, expresses the political relationships of the villages to their allies. That is, the distribution of women in these five villages is a function of the military requirements of the particular villages in the marriage alliance network. Thus, the cline in sex ratio from Bayabobëi-tedi to Bisaasi-tedi (ignoring the Patanowä-tedi, who are not allied to the other groups) reflects a dominance gradient in politico- 125 847 162 628 562 military requirements of each village. The total sample of 576 individuals must be considered in order to estimate the frequency of female infanticide among the Yanomamö, but the political relationships between the villages must be understood to account for the variation by village of the value

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[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 64]

847 562 162 114 982 selves, it is highly unlikely that men will marry a FaSiDa, despite the kinship terminology. Rose did not, however, consider the possibility that sibships may have a systematic bias in their composition; if males tend to be older than their sisters considering all sibships, the probability that a FaSiDa is of marriageable age is increased. I specifically questioned the relationship between female infanticide and FaSiDa marriage, and the Yanomamö denied any correlation between the two practices. There can be no doubt, however, that the occurrence of FaSiDa marriage among the Yanomamö is made more probable by female infanticide.

935 terms for a number of men that were, genealogically, her distant agnates. She explained the usage by the fact that she had incestuous relationships with several of them when she was a young woman." Kpoawë told me that he had incestuous relationships with Hayamamasimi, his FaBrDa, but did not want the others in the village to know about it. In another case, a man married three girls who were his FaBrDaDaDa, i.e., his 'granddaughters.' The Yanomamö explanation of this case illustrates the relationship of the woman shortage to warfare
*621 and alliance. The people in question all live in Patanowë-
*633 tedi, a village that has numerous enemies, only one ally,
162
562 and a serious woman shortage. The parents of the girls in
*628 question did not want them to marry into the village of the
584 allies, as they had given a number of women to the allies
* 582 already. The man, Ishiweiwë, had no spouse and could not
604 get one from the allies. So, the parents of the girls stopped
935 calling Ishiweiwë by the appropriate consanguineal terms and
183 began calling him by affinal terms suited to the marriage of the three girls to him. The girls, however, stopped calling him grandfather. Ishiweiwë married just one of the girls at first; after she died, he married the other two, as he already called them 'wife' by virtue of the fact that he had married their sister. The initial marriage was the major hurdle. After he married the first girl and the kinship terms were

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935 the mother-in-law category are not avoided, nor are FaSi or MoBrWi. The implications of this last fact for Homans and Schneider's work are obvious.

10:Chagnon B-4.5 (1964-1966) 1967 SQ18 Yanomama SQ18

appropriately adjusted, he had no difficulty marrying the remaining two.

The close ties between siblings of the opposite sex and between brothers-in-law are also reflected in the fact that incestuous relationships are not severely punished. Thus, KpotÃwÃ was known to be having an affair with his classificatory sister, KrÃÃmi, but her husband overlooked the matter. Incest is not severely punished. The Yanomamö rely on the internal sanctions of shame and conscience, bolstered supernaturally by the fear that incestuous affairs prevent the release of the soul of the guilty party during cremation. As a counter measure, they dismember the body of someone known to have committed incest during his life time, and burn the parts of the body a much longer time than they normally would have otherwise. Some of the Yanomamö avoid incestuous affairs, according to KpobawÃ, because one of their ancestors turned into a sloth (ihama) after having committed incest. KpobawÃ himself initially denied having incestuous affairs because incest (yaxeremou), as he put it, ". . . is the most despicable thing possible." Later, he confided that he had fornicated with his FaBrDa on a number of occasions and did not seem particularly concerned about the matter, except his fear that I would tell his wife. Other data suggest that incest, far from being feared, is widely practiced. In particular, kinship usage varies considerably from the expected usage predictable from genealogical data and the Iroquois terminology. Whenever I

935 601 183 investigated discrepant kinship usage I found that the terminology changed because of incestuous relationships between my informant (or his close kinsman) and the members of the local lineage in question. I have not investigated all discrepant usages, but the high incidence of the terminological aberrations suggests that incest is widely practiced.

935 601 183 582 [162] [542] Incestuous affairs and marriages occur largely because of the woman shortage. I have already mentioned that Iahiweiwä of Patanowä-tedi married his three 'granddaughters' because he could not find a wife of the appropriate category. A similar situation occurred in Bisaasi-tedi. Naromawä, one of the important men in the lower group of Bisaasi-tedi, has redefined a number of his classificatory daughters as sisters,[1] thereby making it possible for his sons to marry their children, otherwise incestuous marriages. His oldest son, Bäkëbëwä, technically married his FaDaDa, but because his father had redefined the mother of Bäkëbëwä's wife as 'sister,' the marriage was appropriate within their marriage rules.

937 601 578 [721] The woman shortage is remedied by illicit affairs within the village. These affairs are the major cause of feuds and village splits. During the 15 months covered by my field work five club-fights occurred. Four of them were over women who had been caught in illicit affairs, and in one case, the village split into hostile factions that began

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[1]See Chapter 4 for detailed discussion of this.

613 In addition to genealogical distance and size of
162 descent groups, demographic factors promote ambiguity in the relationships between males within a local descent group. For reasons of differential fertility, infanticide, warfare mortality, or chance, some local descent groups are larger than others (contain more males) and are, therefore, more powerful. Others may be relatively large, but contain more females than males. Still others may be very small and contain either all males or
613 all females. Since Yanomamö kinship terminology is classificatory
601 (Iroquois), all agnatically related males of the same generation
602 call each other 'brother'; parallel cousins, no matter how remote genealogically, are not terminologically distinguished from brothers. Despite the terminological usage, relationships between such agnates varies considerably.

613 Problems of agnatic priority in the disposition of
602 females arise, for example, when a man with no actual brothers
621 gives his daughters away in marriage. If he has sons, the
584 sons would prefer that the girls be given to members of other
582 local descent groups who are most likely able to reciprocate with women. As the father has no actual brothers, his more distant agnates put pressure on him to give the girls to a descent group to which they themselves are linked by marriage ties, for they stand to benefit by future reciprocities. Situations such as this arise when a single man finds himself in the same village with a group of agnates that are distantly related to him, but who themselves constitute an important political bloc within the village. Although the agnates are

613 602 621 561 534 582

his brothers, terminologically, they have more in common with each other than they do with him. As he depends on them for support within the village, he is under obligation to them and can not take their suggestions lightly.[1]

621 613 602 562 534 736

Again, if there are two politically important descent groups of the same lineage within a large village, and if there are, in addition, a number of agnatically related females not belonging unambiguously to either one, problems arise over the disposition of the women; there will be rivalry between the two descent groups concerning the marriages (or remarriages) of these women. Situations like these arise when the father and brothers of the women are killed in raids or die of other causes, or when the woman's first husband dies after her (deceased) agnates arranged her marriage. The Bisasai-tedi, for example, split into two villages, each led by members of the same lineage. They had been victimized by a Shamatari group which killed a large number of men during a treacherous feast. There were a number of women, consequently, who were ambiguously related to the surviving males of the Upper and Lower halves of Bisasai-tedi. One of the descent groups in what is now Lower Bisasai-tedi managed to gain the upper hand in the

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[582] [1]There seems to be a marked tendency for the daughters of such men to be given to men in other villages when alliances are made. I am unable to say, on the basis of my present data, whether such alliances are forced on these men by their agnates, or whether these men in fact prefer to dispose of their daughters in this way. This practice tends to keep such men more isolated from their agnates and prevents them from establishing strong affinal ties within the village.

disposition of these women and their children, a factor that did not contribute to the amity of relationships between the two agnatically related descent groups.[1]

A girl's marriage is arranged by her close male kinsmen. Her father has the greatest influence in the decision as to which man she will be given. If the man had adult sons, their opinion can overrule the decision of the father. If a girl marries within the village, she can depend on her agnates for protection against a cruel husband. Ideally, a woman prefers to marry her FaBiSo or her MoBrDa.[2] If the marriage rule is not followed, women prefer to be given to a non-kinsman within the village.

Men are obliged to perform bride service in the village of their inlaws, after which they may take their wife back to their natal village. Occasionally a woman leaves her natal village to seek a husband in another village, but this is always against the wishes of the girl's agnates. Such situations usually develop into wars between the village of the girl and the village that took the girl. The war between

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[1] See Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion of this incident.

[2] By FaBiSo I do not exclusively mean the biological relative, although he, too, would be included. By extending their kinship terminology, the Yanomamö also include non-consanguines in these categories of relatives. For example, a young man in Bisaasi-tedi married his FaBrWiBrDa while I was in the field. To him, the girl was his MoBrDa because FaBr was 'father' and 'father's wife' was 'mother'; the girl, therefore, was MoBrDa.

the Namowei-tedi and the Boreta-tedi (Chapter V) developed out of a case such as this.

When women are given to men in allied villages, the local descent group of the girl (her father and adult brothers and, to a lesser extent, the girl's more distant agnates) decides which patrilineage of the foreign village should have her. Smaller villages are more prone to enter into alliances based on marriage exchanges than are larger villages, since smaller villages require allies to a greater extent than larger ones.[1] Local descent groups in small villages are more cohesive than descent groups in larger villages because they usually comprise a man and his adult sons; if there are distantly related agnates in small villages, these are incorporated into the local descent group. In small villages, therefore, local descent groups are more corporate because all the adult agnates of the girl have a say in her marriage. Ideally, they give the girl to a member of the politically strongest descent group of the allied village, for this group is the one from which aid will come or, conversely, the one most likely to make the decision to initiate hostilities against the smaller village.

The longer an alliance endures, the more likely it is that the exchange of women balances. The two largest

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[1] Larger Yanomamö villages can make visiting alliances with other groups that do not lead to marriage exchanges, as it is relatively unimportant to them to stabilize such alliances by ceding women to militarily inferior groups.

lineages in Bisasasi-tedi, Monou-tedi, and Patanowä-tedi have exchanged women with each other for a number of generations. Male members of the Kor lineage entered into 29 marriage acts[1] with women of the Sha lineage.[2] An identical number of acts involving Sha men with Kor women also took place. In the exchanges between Mʉsaribʉwei-tedi and their two allies, the Monou-tedi and the Bisasasi-tedi, there is presently an imbalance in the exchange of women, although reciprocity appears to be developing; a number of women from the latter two villages were promised to members of Mʉsaribʉwei-tedi--to members of lineages that have already given women to the Bisasasi-tedi and the Monou-tedi.

An imbalance in the exchange of women implies a difference in political strength between the two groups that exchange women, and the mechanics of the exchange are shaped by this difference in political strength. Post marital residence is viri-patrilocal after the groom performs bride service, but the length of the bride service is determined by the relative political strength of the two villages concerned. If the village of the groom is more powerful than that of the bride, the groom may be able to return to his village with his wife after just a few months of bride service. If the

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[1] See Ackerman, 1964, for a definition of marriage act.

[2] Yanomamö lineages are not named. I have named them for expediency of analysis after the oldest identifiable member of the lineage, abbreviating the name to three letters. "Sha" lineage, therefore, is the name I have adopted for the patrilineal descendents of a long since dead individual called Shamashiadima.

bride's village is stronger, the girl's parents may be able to press the groom into a prolonged bride service--five or six years. The Bisaasi-tedi, for example, are politically stronger than the Reyaboböwei-tedi, one of their Shamatari allies. They have obtained a number of women from this group, and the men involved all returned with their brides after brief periods of bride service. So far, not a single Bisaasi-tedi woman has gone to live in Reyaboböwei-tedi, although one girl is married to a man from that village. The man has already spent several years in Bisaasi-tedi, and will probably spend at least as many more before being permitted to return home with his Bisaasi-tedi wife. The military and political superiority of the Bisaasi-tedi is so conspicuous in this alliance that one Bisaasi-tedi man literally dragged a woman, previously promised to him, out of the Reyaboböwei-tedi village, against the wishes of both the woman and the woman's agnates. He was not prevented from doing this because the Reyaboböwei-tedi need the political and military support of the Bisaasi-tedi and could not afford to react violently to the affront. Had the two villages been politically equal, the incident would have resulted in a war.

Women involved in exchanges between villages have no say whatsoever in their fate. Most of them abhor the possibility of moving to a strange village, largely because they fear that they will be mistreated by their husbands. Should a girl refuse to abide by the decision of her agnates, she has no alternative but to flee the village. Koima, a girl of

628 581 609 Affinal ties between villages, therefore, owe their ability to promote solidarity between the allies to the obligations, duties and trading relationships that marriages impose on brothers-in-law.

609 602 621 591 Within villages, brothers-in-law have similar obligations to each other. The strength of the co-residential shoriwä ties, however, is influenced by other factors besides promises to exchange goods, women, and services. First, co-residence itself promotes a certain amount of amity between all classes of kin. Second, co-residential shoriwä are usually cognatically related because their respective agnatic groups have exchanged women in ascending generations, i.e., many of them are related to each other as MoBrDo or FaBiDo. So, in addition to mere promises to give women to each other, co-residential shoriwä ties are strengthened by ties of cognatic kinship and co-residence.

609 602 621 613 582 584 The strength of the ties between co-residential shoriwä is best illustrated by contrasting it to the weakness of the agnatic tie between two local descent groups of the same lineage. In anticipation of the discussion of agnatic relationship, I will point out here that the political interests of local descent groups focus on acquisition of women from other descent groups within the village. When a village has two or more agnatically related descent groups, the men in these respective groups are de facto rivals for the women in the village. Simultaneously, these distantly related agnates are frequently competitors in the disposition of some female agnates who do not belong unambiguously to one or the other local descent groups.

groups. In a large village comprised of two large lineages, each having two or more local descent groups, the particular local descent groups of each lineage will have stronger ties with non-agnatic descent groups within that village than with groups of distantly related agnates. When there are feuds within the village, the groups that have most in common with each other are those linked by affinal rather than agnatic ties, and these affinally linked groups stick together should the feud lead to a village split.[1] While the tie between closely related agnates is stronger than that between brothers-in-law, the latter are usually stronger than the ties between distantly related agnates.

Finally, the son-in-law tie complements the brother-in-law tie in binding local descent groups to each other within villages. Older adult males of local descent groups can depend on the support of brothers, brothers-in-law, and sons-in-law in village feuds, more so than on the support of distantly related agnates. In the competition for women, affines in a faction exchange women rather than compete for them; just the opposite is true of the relationships between distantly related agnates.

2. Agnatic ties

One of the two most important consanguineal ties having structural concomitants among the Yanomamö is the tie between siblings of the opposite sex. These are not as

[1] See Chapter IV for a detailed discussion of the structure of village factions.

capable of becoming stronger in time. When two descent groups exchange women with each other over several generations, the agnatically related members of the two groups have strong ties with each other. Further exchanges between these groups is largely a validation of the previously existing implicit obligations to exchange women. Mo'rõo is, whether or not you marry his sister, a shoriwë. When the marriage rule is followed, and it is a number of times each generation, the ties between shoriwë are correspondingly strengthened by the exchange. Agnatic ties do not have the potential of increasing in solidarity; the tendency seems, in fact, to be just the opposite.

The major components in the variation of the strength of agnatic solidarity are genealogical closeness, relative age, and co-residence. To provide a crude measure of the relative importance of these variables, I have arbitrarily assigned values to the components in Table 3. A strong tie is scored as "****" and a weak tie as "____". By adding the number of asterisks in each possible combination, a rough measure of relative solidarity of agnatic type is given. For example, agnates who are closely related genealogically (A_1: "****"), who differ significantly in age (B_2: "****") and who live in the same village (C_1: "**_*") represent a class of agnates having the greatest relative solidarity. The sum of the asterisks for this combination is 8.

In Table 3, combinations whose scores are 3 and 4 respectively constitute the class of agnates having the least

internal feuding that promotes splitting, and threat of raids from other groups that inhibits village splitting and/or promotes the establishment of alliances with other groups. These two forces shape the composition and structure of Ignomamõ villages; that is, these two forces impinge on kinship relationships and together with these latter determine the nature of the Ignomamõ village.

I will show in Chapter V that larger villages fragment into smaller groups when internal feuding becomes particularly intense, but are occasionally forced to re-unite when warfare threatens the splinter groups. Ignomamõ villages would remain small if there were no military forces working on them. The Patanowẽ-tedi, for example, attempted to split into three groups after separating from the Bisaasi-tedi;[1] the three factions re-combined, however, when one of them was attacked by the Hasabõwẽ-tedi. Similarly, the non-Patanowẽ-tedi faction of the split (Bisaasi-tedi and Monou-tedi) likewise split into smaller factions after the threat of raids from the outside subsided. Again, these recombined when threat of raids was imminent.

Irrespective of the conditions of the splitting, the newly formed villages approximate a dual organization of inter-marrying moieties in structure. This form of organization is implicit in the Iroquois kinship terminology, sister exchange, and ambilateral cross-cousin marriage rules. Dual

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[1]See Map C and Chapter V.

organization is only approximated, however, as an examination of the genealogies given in Appendix A will show. The smaller the village, the more conspicuous is the tendency for the composition to approach a moiety-like structure. Larger villages are more composite and may contain as many as four or five distinct lineage segments.[1]

The tendency for small villages to be characterized by two (and only two) dominant lineage segments, each linked to the other by marriage ties, recurs with sufficient frequency to permit me to use a simple dual organization model as the basis of the analysis of village structure. The model given in Figure 1 should be taken as only a heuristic device in the discussion of Yanomamö village structure that follows; the Yanomamö do not conceive of their villages as being bifurcated into two groups, for in most instances they are not. And, small villages soon lose their moiety-like structure as they begin to include males and females from villages with which marriage ties are made.

The relationships between kin discussed in the previous chapter are all given in Figure 1. The adult males in Generation 1 exchange sisters[2] and are, therefore, related to each other as shoriwä (brother-in-law). This is a well-defined, stable, non-ambiguous relationship; the males in

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[1] See Appendix A for a discussion of village composition. Details of one small village are given in the Appendix, but the composition by lineage is summarized for three other villages.

[2] In Figure 1, $A_{1.1}$'s wife is the sister of $B_{1.2}$.

602 607 582 583 Generation 1 have essentially solidary relationships to each other, at least in terms of the model.

The males of Generation 1 are related to the females [621] of that generation as either husband or brother. Ties between siblings of the opposite sex are affective and promote village solidarity.

613 602 Males of lineage A in the second generation are simultaneously sister's sons and daughter's husbands of male $B_{1.2}$, both relationships being conducive to solidarity. They are [583] bound to $B_{1.2}$ by affective ties and obligations to perform bride service. An analogous set of relationships binds the Generation 2, lineage B males to $A_{1.1}$. The males of both lineages in the second generation are related to each other as either brother or brother-in-law, both relationships being stable within the assumptions of this model (see below). The

[621] FIG. 1: Ideal Yanomamö Village Composition



621 622 623 602 the kinship system to his advantage, putting all adult men in the village in a subordinate position to himself. Let us briefly examine the composition of this village.

Figure 2 shows the ties between the two lineages over three generations: the individuals in both lineages are tied to each other by consanguineal as well as affinal ties. In a negative sense, the village is characterized by an absense of remotely-related agnates that might constitute a challenge to Reromawë for leadership. All agnates within each faction are closely related to each other, and their mutual rights and obligations in the political affairs of the village are well defined. The hangers-on, on the other hand, are related to males of the two core lineages by stable, but subordinate, affinal ties such as son-in-law or brother-[156] in-law. Reromawë is a particularly capable leader on the basis of his personal qualifications alone.[1] His position as leader is bolstered by the nature of the ties that link him, individual by individual, to every adult male in the [593] village. He has four adult sons to support his position. [601] Equally significant, he has manipulated the kinship system [554] and 'changed' the generation of a number of his kinswomen so [183] as to advance his position as leader. [582] He redefined two classificatory daughters as 'sisters,' making it possible to arrange marriages between his own children and the children [736] of these women. He was able to do this because many of the

[593] [1]His son, Bëkëbówë, is gradually assuming some of the functions of leadership, as Reromawë is getting old.

actual brothers of these women were killed in the 1950-51 treacherous feast,[1] and the women therefore had few agnates to contest Reromawë's actions; his rights to dispose of these women increased after their brothers were killed in the feast. Because of the previous marriages between the members of the Sha and Tom lineages, Reromawë was already MoBr to the politically most important males in the Tom lineage, and he could command respect from them by virtue of the fact that he was of the ascending generation and principal wife-giver to them. He in fact gave two daughters to one of these men. When he re-defined one of his classificatory daughters as sister, he advanced his position in two ways. First, he then became shoriwë to the man that was married to this sister (the man was already SiSo to Reromawë), compounding the cognatic tie (SiSo) that linked them with an important affinal tie (shoriwë). Second, he was able then to claim a daughter of this 'sister' as a wife for his own son (despite the fact that it was incestuous), creating additional stable ties between the two lineages on another generational level.

In another, similar, case, Reromawë re-defined a different classificatory daughter as 'sister,' making it possible for her son to marry his daughter. This was a strategic move, for the man involved was of the Hor lineage, a dominant political group in Upper Bisaasi-tedi and Monou-tedi. Thus, by manipulating the kinship system, Reromawë advanced his own position as village leader and managed to

[1] See Chapter V.

*621 622 613 602 subordinate his potential competitors by the way in which he disposed of the women and/or their children.

*621 613 602 562 582 583 There are a number of individuals in Lower Bisaasi-tedi who are not related agnatically to either the Sha or the Tom lineages. These individuals do not, however, constitute a political bloc; each is tied by marriage to the two lineages, and are therefore subordinate (by virtue of obligations to their wife-givers) to the members of that lineage. Most of these individuals are females, and do not represent a political factor in the affairs of the village. Some of them were abducted from Shamatari villages in the past, and a larger number of them were obtained in marriage alliances from other Shamatari recently. The six adult males of this non-agnatic group who might pose a threat to the stability of the village by making liaisons with married women are all married themselves. With the exception of two brothers, they are unrelated to each other. One of them is married to Reromawë's daughter, another is married to his son's daughter, and the two brothers (actual WiBrSo to Reromawë) are married, respectively, to Reromawë's classificatory son's daughter in Upper Bisaasi-tedi and will move there while he does his bride service, and a classificatory brother's daughter.[1] The remaining two men are in Faction B. One of these joined Reromawë's group before 1945 to get revenge against the

[1] This woman is one of the seven abducted by the Monou-tedi from the Patanowë-tedi and taken, in turn, by Reromawë's group from the Monou-tedi. Technically, then, Reromawë is her 'father' and the man to whom she was given is 'son-in-law' to Reromawë. See Chapter V.

*621 members of his own village, Hasabŏwä-tedi, who killed his
613 father. Reromawä's group was then actively raiding Hasabŏwä-
602 tedi. The man was given a wife in Reromawä's village, the
562 widow of a Tom man killed in the 1950-51 treacherous feast.
582 The man's two daughters are married to Sha men.[1] The last
583 man and his family joined Reromawä's group in 1965 to take refuge from his own villagers, the Mǫmaribŏwei-tedi, some of whom wanted to take his wives away from him for being brutal. He had previously given a daughter to a Tom man and when he was forced to flee from his own village, took refuge with his son-in-law. Appendix A gives more details on each individual discussed above.

*628 Lower Bisaasi-tedi has political ties with a number
582 of villages. It has recently (since 1960) entered into al-
583 liance with two Shamatari villages, Reyabobŏwei-tedi and Mǫmaribŏwei-tedi, and has managed to obtain a number of women from the latter village as wives for young bachelors
*628 in the group. The Mǫmaribŏwei-tedi visit them frequently to
527 feast and trade, and the members of Lower Bisaasi-tedi
574 reciprocate the visits. The ties between Lower Bisaasi-tedi
438 and the Mǫmaribŏwei-tedi are nearly as strong as the ties
602 between Lower Bisaasi-tedi and any of its cognate villages to whose members the Lower Bisaasi-tedi are agnatically re-
*628 lated. Of the villages that are cognate to Lower Bisaasi-tedi,
602 Monou-tedi is perhaps the most dependable ally, because the

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[1] Reromawä's actual son, and Reromawä's classificatory son in Upper Bisaasi-tedi.

10:Chagnon E-4.5 (1964-1966) 1967 SQ18 Yanoama SQ18

historical relationships between villages to properly interpret marriage ties between them. With regard to the last point, I found that numerous individuals in Bisaasi-tedi claimed to be from Patanowë-tedi; my initial conclusions concerning their marriage to individuals from Bisaasi-tedi was that the marriages were village-exogamic. I was obliged to reassess these marriages after I learned that the two villages were at one time one village, and most of the marriages between the two groups were contracted while the groups were living together. I therefore investigated in detail the historical relationships between all the villages in the Mavaca area, a portion of the results constituting the subject of this chapter.

I have summarized the village movements in Tables 5 and 6 and have indicated these movements graphically on Map C. The reader may, if he wishes, skip the details of the histories and turn at this point to the concluding remarks of this chapter. I can make the four points by using only Tables 5 and 6, in conjunction with Map C. However, I cannot illustrate Yanomamö political behavior without recourse to details of the village movements and the wars that caused them and, accordingly, I include the details of the histories in this chapter. The political relationships that presently obtain between the two Shamatari villages (Mõmaribõwei-tedi and Reyabobõwei-tedi) and their allies, the Bisaasi-tedi and Monou-tedi, can not be completely understood without knowing their respective histories in some detail. Most of the

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 149]

128 361 174 *628 583 marriage alliances on which I have complete data have taken place between the Shamatari and the two villages of Monou-tedi and Bisaasi-tedi. Over 50% of recently contracted marriages[1] that represent breaches of the marriage rule preferences were the result of alliances between the villages whose histories are given here. It is, accordingly, important to understand the political and historical circumstances that led to these alliances.

174 175 361 *128 (621) A. The History of the Namowei-tedi Group

The Namowei-tedi lived in four different areas between ca. 1880 and 1943, splitting into two villages in 1943 shortly after they moved to their fifth location. I outline below the events that led to the abandoning of the first four areas and discuss in more detail the activities of the villages after they established their fifth location. I will treat the ParuritawÃ-tedi group similarly in Part B of this chapter.

174 175 *628 *621 Area 1: Konata-tedi (See Map C)

While living in this area the Naomwei-tedi were on friendly terms with several Shamatari villages, numbering them among their allies. The Shamatari as a distinct group were just coming into being between 1880 and 1900. (582) (583) Intermarriages between the Namowei-tedi and members of several Shamatari villages occurred and a number of individuals in the present villages of Bisaasi-tedi, Monou-tedi, and PatanowÃ-tedi trace descent back to Shamatari ancestors.

[1] These data on marriages are taken from the villages of Upper and Lower Bisaasi-tedi and Monou-tedi.

628 721 782 241 726 the Patanowä-tedi for managing to overwhelm their own force led them to declare war on the Patanowä-tedi. The Monou-tedi immediately began making a new garden at Moyenaböwei, across the Mavaca River from their village and several hours inland, anticipating the war that they knew would follow. After they had cleared the large trees from their new garden site, they raided the Patanowä-tedi in the last week of January 1965, and succeeded in killing Bosibrei.

927 581 582 593 628 Another important event took place while the Monou-tedi were clearing the trees from their new garden site, an event that illustrates the same principle of political philosophy. One of the stolen women, Kakoma, was given to a young man, Karidimö, who had only one leg. Karidimö could not do heavy work, and when his village moved inland to clear their new site Karidimö moved to Bisaasi-tedi with his new wife. Kakoma, however, was not pleased with her new husband, and asked the Bisaasi-tedi if she could stay with them, hoping that she would be permitted to rejoin the Patanowä-tedi if they returned to Bisaasi-tedi to visit. The Bisaasi-tedi men obligingly took her away from Karidimö by force and gave her to a bachelor in their own village. Karidimö, enraged at this, returned to Monou-tedi to recruit aid.

628 721 578 This put the Monou-tedi in a difficult position. They were planning to raid the Patanowä-tedi and would have to maintain good relations with the Bisaasi-tedi if the revenge raids from the Patanowä-tedi became intense. They could not, however, overlook the insult to Karidimö, for this

000 the factions still remain on friendly terms.

*621 *628 578 726 105 Material presented in the discussion above--details of the movements of factions that are not relevant to the origin of the five villages considered here--also support the contention that villages split over internal feuds. That villages are structurally unstable is evidenced by the sheer number of village splits and the fact that the related factions enter into hostilities with each other after separating. Data I collected on village movements for other Yanomamö groups support the conclusions I reach here.

*621 *628 602 582 583 105 [613] One can see that the process of village splitting leads to the formation of independent villages that comprise closely-related kinsmen. Intuitively, one can also see that marriages "between" such villages, i.e., between spouses that each claim to be of different villages, do not necessarily represent political alliances between those villages, for in many cases the marriages were contracted between the local lineages involved before they separated. This is not to say that all the cases of this sort can be dismissed in this fashion. Some marriages between ambilateral cross-cousins are in fact properly interpreted as marriage alliances between villages, for occasionally related villages enter into alliances with each other. In these cases, the marriages between them come about for essentially the same reasons that the exogamic marriages between unrelated groups occur. In short, the existence of the marriage rule alone does not account for alliances between related groups that enter into politico-military pacts.

10:Chagnon E-4.5 (1964-1966) 1967 SQ18 Yanoama SQ18

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

128 In the body of this dissertation I have attempted to demonstrate that two variables in particular exert an overriding effect on Yąnomamö social structure. These are, respectivley, the shortage of women and the intensity of actual warfare. In this final chapter, I should like to accomplish two ends. First, I should like to set my conclusions against different material recently gathered among the Yąnomamö in northern Brazil.[1] Second, I should like to bring my material to bear on the discussion between Leach (1957) and Fortes (1959a, 1959b) regarding the relationship of kinship, marriage ties, descent and politics.

121 721 582 183 Let us turn first to comparative Yąnomamö ethnology. If it is true, as I have argued, that warfare enhances the

[1]After I had completed the text of the thesis I had an opportunity to discuss with Ernesto Migliazza the social organization of a number of Brazilian Yąnomamö groups. Migliazza, a linguist, spent nearly six years among the Uraricaá Yąnomamö, working for a Baptist Mission and, more recently, for the Goeldi Museum in Belém. I thank him for permission to use much of the comparative material presented below; some of it has already been published in his 1964 work. I introduce this new data because it very effectively demonstrates the interrelationships between the variables discussed in the thesis. I would have arrived at the same conclusions, by employing arguments similar to those used by Meggitt (1965), but the contrast provided by this new material makes the conclusions more defensible.

[114]

likelihood that marriage practices will depart from the rules governing ideal marriage behavior, then we would expect a reduction in warfare to produce a reduction of this gap. A decrease in warfare should obviate the need for military alliances validated by exchanges of women; under such conditions marriage practice should conform more closely to preferential rules.

The Yąnomamö who live on the Upper Uraricoera and Uraricaá rivers of northern Brazil differ markedly in a number of traits from the Venezuelan Yąnomamö of the Mavaca basin considered in this thesis. A major point of difference is that among the former warfare is much less common than it is among the Yąnomamö described in the preceding chapters. It is likely that this reduction in warfare is partly due to more frequent contact of the Brazilian Yąnomamö with Carib-speaking Indian tribes (Makiritare and Arekuna) and, since 1958, with Christian missions. There appears to be a cline in the decreasing intensity of warfare from southwest, the area in which I conducted my field work, to northeast, the area from which these new data are drawn (see Map D, next page). Yąnomamö from the Upper Padamo River, an area about on the mid-point of this cline, told me that fighting with clubs was very rare in their villages. Migliazza[1] asserts that raiding between villages on the Uraricoera River occurs only every four or five years and is usually provoked by

[1]Personal communication.

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 195]

accusations of sorcery or by the desire to abduct women.

Another major difference between the Uraricaá and the Mavaca Yąnomamö is the manner in which they treat extra-marital liaisons. On the Uraricaá, liaisons are tacitly permitted and fighting rarely develops between a man and his wife's lover. Should fighting occur, it is generally caused by some incident unrelated to the affair itself. In short, men permit their wives to have extra-marital affairs, provided the women are discreet.

Of major analytical significance is the fact that the Uraricaá Yąnomamö closely adhere to their rules of ambilateral cross-cousin marriage.[1] This stems from the fact that political alliances between villages there never involve the transfer of women from one group to the other. The Yąnomamö of the Uraricaá are endogamous within each congeries of villages having a common history. It would seem, therefore, that the absence of intensive warfare permits marriage practice to follow marriage rules.

The Uraricaá settlement pattern and village organization differ considerably from those found among the Yąnomamö of the Mavaca basin. What I have called a small village of 40 people among the latter segments, on the Uraricaá, into clusters of extended family units separated from each other by as much as half a mile (Migliazza, 1964). The village in which Migliazza lived, for example, comprised 80 persons

[1] Migliazza was not able to give me statistical data on actual marriage practices. I intend to collect this kind of information in January-February 1967 when I visit the Uraricaá area.

114 121 602 -- Among the Yąnomamö consanguineal kinship does not have the quality attributed to kinship in general by Fortes, and we therefore cannot explain the stability that exists in terms of these alleged properties. The fact that affinal ties do promote a certain amount of stability between Yąnomamö descent groups supports Leach's arguments, and, for the reasons implied by Leach: Yąnomamö marriages occur within a political context that promotes military obligations and concomitants not predictable from first principles regarding the putative nature of kinship itself. Descent groups exchange women with an eye toward maximizing military advantage in a milieu of hostile political relationships. The stability brought about by such marriages is, therefore, largely a function of the politico-military ends served by marriage and is only tangentially, if at all, a result of kinship.

121 I would also like to discuss the nature of the relationship between corporation and descent from another point of view, for the nature of the estate of the Yąnomamö descent corporation gives a particular quality to the corporation. Most corporate lineal descent groups have as one of their major functions the control over and disposition of property. The property is usually real property. Pastoralists, of course, have as their estates, herds and use rights to forage areas. Some Northwest Coast and northern California tribes have corporate groups whose estates are acorn groves and portions of salmon streams.

In addition to real property, corporate groups

for being fierce long ago, and other men respect him. He also has five mature brothers who support him, and he has given a number of his sisters to other men in the village, thereby putting them under some obligation to him. In short, his "natural" following (kinsmen) is large, and he does not have to constantly display his ferocity. People already respect him and take his suggestions seriously.

Rerebawä is much younger, only about twenty-two years old (See Fig. 1-5). He has just one wife by whom he has had three children. He is from Karohi-teri, one of the villages to which Kaobawä's is allied. Rerebawä left his village to seek a wife in Kaobawä's group because there were no eligible women there for him to marry.

Rerebawä is perhaps more typical than Kaobawä in the sense that he is concerned about his reputation for ferocity and goes out of his way to act tough. He is, however, much braver than the other men his age and backs up his threats with action. Moreover, he is concerned about politics and knows the details of intervillage relationships over a large area. In this respect he shows all the attributes of a headman, although he is still too young and has too many competent older brothers in his own village to expect to move easily into the position of leadership there.

He does not intend to stay in Kaobawä's group and has not made a garden. He feels that he has adequately discharged his obligations to his wife's parents by providing them with fresh game for three years. They should let him take the wife and return to his own village with her, but they refuse and try to entice him to remain permanently in Bisaasi-teri to provide them with game when they are old. They have even promised to give him their second daughter if he will stay permanently.

Although he has displayed his ferocity in many ways, one incident in particular shows what his character is like. Before he left his own village to seek a wife, he had an affair with the wife of an older brother. When he was discovered, his brother attacked him with a club. Rerebawä was infuriated so he grabbed an axe and drove his brother out of the village after soundly beating him with the flat of the blade. The brother was so afraid that he did not return to the village for several days. I recently visited his village with him. He made a point to introduce me to this brother. Rerebawä dragged him out of his hammock by the arm and told me, "This is the brother whose wife I had an affair with," a deadly insult. His brother did nothing and slunk back into his hammock, shamed, but relieved to have Rerebawä release the vise-grip on his arm.

Despite the fact that he admires Kaobawä, he has a low opinion of the others in Bisaasi-teri. He admitted confidentially that he thought Bisaasi-teri was an abominable group: "This is a terrible neighborhood! All the young men are lazy and cowards and everybody is committing incest! I'll be glad to get back home." He also admired Kaobawä's brother, the headman of Monou-teri. This man was killed by raiders while I was doing my fieldwork. Rerebawä was disgusted that the others did not chase the raiders when they discovered the shooting: "He was the only fierce one in the whole group; he was my close friend. The cowardly Monou-teri hid like women in the jungle and didn't even chase the raiders!"

Even though Rerebawä is fierce and capable of being quite nasty, he has a good side as well. He has a very biting sense of humor and can entertain the group for hours on end with jokes and witty comments. And, he is one of few Yanomamö that I feel I can trust. When I returned to Bisaasi-teri after having been away for a year, Rerebawä was in his own village visiting his kinsmen. Word reached him that I had returned, and

11: Chagnon E-5 (1964-1968) 1968 SQ18 Yanomama SQ18

*621 *628 Village size is an important factor in determining the degree to which a Yąnomamö group must depend on its neighbors for military support in the face of raids. Small villages must make alliances to survive. Village size, as I mentioned in Chapter 1, ranges *621 from 40 to 250 inhabitants. Approximately one-third of the village consists of males who 701 are able to participate in the raiding, that is, men who are between 17 and 40 years old. 722 The tactics of warfare are such that a village must be able to field a raiding party of approximately 10 men in order to be able to raid effectively. In addition, when the raiders are away, there must always be a few men at home to protect the women and children. Thus, the military requirements alone seem to demand that a village have at least 15 able-bodied men. As these represent about a third of the group, the minimum village size required by the raiding techniques is 40 to 50 people. I have never seen a village fall below this size in an area where raiding is active, and virtually every village split I investigated took place only when each of the resulting groups contained 40 or more people.

*621 The upper limit to village size is also determined in large measure by the intensity 721 of warfare. The village of Patanowä-teri, for example, has over 200 people. It was being .726 raided actively by about a dozen different groups while I conducted my fieldwork, groups that raided it about twenty-five times in a period of fifteen months. The Patanowä-teri at one time had split into three groups of about equal size, but raids from their enemies forced them to reunite for common defense. In general, a village will fusion after it [578] reaches a population of about 150 because internal feuds and fights are so frequent that peace can only be maintained with great difficulty. A village of 100 individuals, for example, can fusion to produce two militarily viable groups of about 50 people each. Only the threat of raids from powerful neighbors will, as in the case of the Patanowä-teri, inhibit the fusioning, and frequently the fusion groups will reunite in a single village to fend off the raids of their enemies.

* [628] But a small group of 40 to 50 people is not as viable as a group twice that size. Consequently, it enters into alliances with its neighbors.

*621 • 582 166 FISSION AND SETTLEMENT There is a tendency for the group to attempt to maximize its size after it becomes an independent entity. This is done by trying to keep all marriages within the group so that there is very little migration of young men and women to other villages after marriage. A small group also welcomes the addition of families from other villages, families that have gotten into fights in their own group and who prefer to leave rather than attempt to patch up their grievances with their kinsmen. Finally, the group tries to attract young men and women from other villages, encouraging them to settle permanently in the group. Rerëhawä, for example, is under considerable pressure to remain permanently in Kąobawä's group.

*621 578 837 As the village grows in size and varies in composition, it becomes increasingly difficult to keep order and peace. Extramarital sexual liaisons are more frequent in larger villages, because the probability is lower that the affairs will be discovered. When the Monou-teri rejoined Kąobawä's group to avoid the raids of their enemies, a bloody club fight developed between two men of that village over an affair one of them had with the other's wife. The culprit waited until the group joined Kąobawä's village before approaching the woman, thinking that with so many people in one village he would not be caught.

By the time a village approaches 100 to 150 people, such fights over women are

11: Chagnon E-5 (1964-1968) 1968 SQ18 Yanoama SQ18

3

Social Organization

128 THREE ASPECTS of Yąnomamö social organization will be dealt with: the ideal rules about marriage and the logical consequence of these rules—actual cases of Yąnomamö marriage are compared to the pattern of ideal marriage to justify the use of a model to describe Yąnomamö social structure; the demographic and political factors that bring about discrepancies between actual behavior and ideal behavior; the more important aspects of the division of labor and of ordinary daily life in the society.

Social Structure

121 This section is the most technical portion of the chapter; careful study of the
128 diagrams is required as the text is read. Kinship is the heart of primitive social structure, and it must be understood in detail rather than through generalities. The rules governing
• [582] marriage, along with the kinship system, together comprise and delineate the structure
[602] of Yąnomamö society. There is no simple way to present the data, which itself is frequently boring to even accomplished anthropologists, and students of anthropology must sooner or later come to grips with this important topic. Fortunately, the Yąnomamö kinship system is the type most commonly found among the world's primitives and it is, comparatively speaking, quite easy to grasp once the patterns in the diagram are spotted.

128 The important features of Yąnomamö social structure are represented in the model shown in Fig. 3-1. This diagram is based on an analysis of Yąnomamö marriage rules, kinship terminology, and other social and ideological features characteristic of their behavior. The symbols given in the legend of Fig. 3-1 will also be used in the diagrams that follow. It should be borne in mind that the model is only an ideal representation of Yąnomamö society; we shall see below how closely actual behavior conforms to this model. One of the objectives of structural anthropology is to attempt comparisons of different kinds of societies by using models of this type. In the discussions that follow I shall present some actual field data to justify the use of this model to represent Yąnomamö social structure.



Fig. 3-1. Ideal Yanomamö marriage pattern.

Fig. 3-1 can be presumed to represent the organization of a particular village over five generations, starting in the year 1888. Let us assume that the village originated in that year when individuals x_1 (and his sister, not numbered) and y_1 (and his sister) broke away from a larger village and established their own garden at some new location. Thus, in the year 1888, the village was comprised of two groups of kinsmen, X and Y. These two kinship groups are called lineages, the distinctive features of which I will discuss later.

In generation I, x_1 married the sister of y_1 and, in exchange, gave his own sister to y_1 as wife. This marriage practice is called *brother-sister exchange* and characterizes Yanomamö marriage behavior. A man is under considerable obligation to reciprocate a woman to the kinship group from which he has taken one. In Fig. 3-1, x_1 married y_1's sister and reciprocated the exchange by giving his own sister to y_1. Because of this obligation of reciprocity, kinship groups become interdependent socially and from point of woman-exchanging kin groups. These paired kinship groups are discussed below in the context of village fissioning.

In generation II of Fig. 3-1, the village still contains only two groups of intermarrying kinsmen. These are the children of the individuals who founded the village. The reciprocal exchanges of women between the two groups of kinsmen (lineages X and Y) continue in the second generation, x_2 getting his wife from lineage Y and vice versa. Like their fathers, x_2 and y_2 exchanged sisters. It will be noted at this point that x_2 has married his mother's brother's daughter, who is simultaneously his father's sister's daughter.[1] This is a logical consequence of the fact that there are only *two* lineages in

[1] This is called bilateral cross-cousin marriage. See glossary for definitions. Hereafter the following abbreviations will be used, following Murdock, 1949: Mo—mother; Fa—father; Br—brother; Si—sister; So—son; and Da—daughter. Thus, "mother's brother's daughter" is simply MoBrDa.

11: Chagnon E-5 (1964-1968) 1968 SQ18 Yanoama SQ18

the village, the members of which being related to each other as brother and sister, and the fact that individuals must marry outside their own lineages.

The important features of the lineages X and Y are now clearly visible in generation II: The lineages are patrilineal and exogamous. That is, males and females belong to the lineage of their father (patrilineality), and individuals must marry people who belong to a different lineage (exogamy). This can be seen more clearly in the symbols used in Fig. 3–1. All males of lineage X are designated by triangles (x_1, x_2, x_3 . . . x_n), and all females of lineage X are designated by hexagons. Similarly, all males of lineage Y are designated as squares and all females by circles. Males of lineage X marry females of lineage Y. Their children belong to lineage X because their *father* (patrilineality) is of lineage X.

The Yąnomamö kinship system also reflects the rules of lineage exogamy, brother-sister exchange and reciprocity. Their kinship system is called the "bifurcate merging" type with "Iroquois" cousin terms (see Glossary). Within each generation, all the males of one lineage call each other "brother," and all the women call each other "sister." Males of lineage X call males of lineage Y "brother-in-law" and are eligible to marry their sisters. In fact, the males of lineage X call the females of lineage Y "wife" *whether or not they marry them*. This is likewise true for the males of lineage Y with respect to the females of lineage X. This brings us to another important Yąnomamö marriage rule: A male must marry a woman of the category called *naabiya*—"wife." This is called a *prescriptive* marriage rule.[2] To state it more precisely, Yąnomamö society is characterized by a rule that enjoins a man to marry a woman of a specific kinship category; he has no choice with respect to the category.

There is an important controversy over the meaning and implications of the term "prescriptive." I have given the definition held by British anthropologists generally, by Needham (1962a:91) in particular. This definition emphasizes the fact that men have no choice with respect to the category of women from which their wives must come, that men are forbidden to marry women of other categories, and that the society itself is said to be characterized by the prescriptive rule. The opposition to this definition comes largely from certain American anthropologists, who maintain that a society can only be said to have a prescriptive marriage rule when a high percentage (close to 100 percent) of the people marry according to the rule (see Coult and Hammel 1963:291). The issues involved are not quite as simple as this, but a glimmering of the area of contention can be seen in an example provided by Leach (1963). Rephrasing his example, the rule (in our society) "thou shalt not kill" is like the rule (among, say, the Yąnomamö) "thou shalt marry a woman of category A." These rules can be said to exist in the respective societies irrespective of the homocide rate in New York or the frequency of aberrant marriages in a Yąnomamö village. That is, Leach (and Needham) maintain that one cannot discover such a rule by counting examples of murder (or, rather, "non-murder") or marriages of men to women of category A. The more basic issue, however, is the

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[2] Professor Lévi-Strauss, who read an earlier draft of this chapter, quite correctly pointed out that to say a marriage system is "prescriptive" is to say no more than "a man must marry a marriageable female," which is a tautology. Nevertheless, we must have some way to distinguish a system that permits marriage with only a single category of women from those that permit marriage with women of several categories. By showing what is meant by the Yąnomamö category *naabiya*, as I have attempted to do in Fig. 3-2, the reader will gain some idea of what is meant by that marriage type. I have used the term "prescriptive" because it is the current usage.

11: Chagnon E-5 (1964-1968) 1968 SQ18 Yanoama SQ18

meaning of, in this case, "category A." It is customary to represent primitive kinship categories in models (for example, Fig. 3–1) by their closest biological equivalents in *our own kinship system*. Many critics of Needham's definition of prescription fail to appreciate the fact that *FaSiDa* and *MoBrDa* in a model like the one given in Fig. 3–1 represent just *two* of several kinds of kinswomen who fall into the prescribed category. That is, they interpret the native's kinship category from the narrow point of view of one of that category's biological meanings in *our own kinship system*. (I have given ten examples of actual Yąnomamö marriages in Fig. 3–2, discussed later, to illustrate what the categories FaSiDa and MoBrDa mean to the Yąnomamö.) The use of Needham's definition of prescription to characterize Yąnomamö marriage rules can be justified, therefore, on several grounds. First, the Yąnomamö assert that a man must marry a woman of the *mashiya* category. Second, of the six primary categories used by men to classify female relatives, five of them embrace women who stand in incestuous relationship to the male speaker, and he is forbidden to marry any woman that falls into any of these five additional categories. Third, we will see below how closely the alternative definition of prescription fits the Yąnomamö, using their own notions of kinship to reckon relationships between males and females.[3]

In Fig. 3–1, marriageable women are related to their husbands as both FaSiDa and MoBrDa; this is an artifact of the way in which the model is drawn. These two kinds of kinswomen are the closest biological equivalents in our kinship system for the Yąnomamö term "*mashiya*" "wife." It must be emphasized, however, that given the classificatory nature of the Yąnomamö kinship system (for example, men of the same generation and of the same lineage are "brothers"), there are several ways to be related to a woman as "wife."

Something new has happened in generation III. A man (W_1) from a distant village, along with his sister, has joined the group. Both he and his sister have married into lineage X. Thus, there are three lineages represented in the village (W, X, and Y); and the *dual organization* characterizing generations I and II is now lost.[4] A Yąnomamö village can incorporate new lineages into its social life by an extension of marriage ties to its members. As can be seen from Fig. 3–1, the same rules—exogamy, reciprocity, patrilineal descent, and brother-sister exchange—that characterize the behavior of the members of lineages X and Y also hold for the members of the new lineage, W. The incorporation of lineage W takes place this way. W_1 joined the village in 1928 (generation III) because x_3 and x_4 promised him one of their sisters. As shown in Fig. 3–1, he did, in fact, marry one of their sisters and gave, in exchange, one of his sisters to x_3.

This (potentially) brings about an important structural change in the village with

[3]For an excellent summary of the various arguments concerning "prescriptive alliance," see Maybury-Lewis 1965a.

[4]A society is said to have dual organization when, for example, it is comprised of two intermarrying kinship groups, such as lineages X and Y in generations I and II of Fig. 3–1. In some societies the intermarrying kin groups are named, for example, "Bear Clan (or Moiety)" and "Thunderbird Clan (or Moiety)." The Yąnomamö do not have named kinship groups such as this. Dual organization is, however, implied in their kinship terminology and marriage rules and, as will be seen, villages tend to have two (and only two) politically dominant lineages that intermarry. In short, the Yąnomamö village tends to be comprised *in fact* of two dominant kinship groups but lacks some of the ideology, such as named pairs of intermarrying kin groups, of classical dual organization. See: Maybury-Lewis, 1960 and 1967; Lévi-Strauss, 1963, Chapter VIII; Nimuendajú and Lowie, 1937; and Malinowski, 1986, for further descriptions and analyses of societies having dual organization.

11: Chagnon E-5 (1964-1968) 1968 SQ18 Yanoama SQ18

respect to the male members of lineage X. Generation III shows that individuals x_3 and x_4 are full brothers. The individuals x_5 and x_6 of generation IV, however, are not shown as brothers, although in Yąnomamö kinship usage they would be such.

I have not indicated them as being related as brothers in order to draw attention to a fault line that may develop when the members of a single lineage (X in this case) marry into more than one other lineage (W and Y in this case). x_3 and one of his sisters married into lineage W, whereas x_4 and one of his sisters continued to exchange with members of lineage Y. In the following generation the kinship tie of "brother" between x_5 and x_6 is considerably weaker than the same "brother" tie between their fathers (x_3 and x_4). In generation V, the "brother" tie between x_7 and x_8 is weaker still. One of the reasons that *agnatic* ties[5] weaken in this case is that the men in question are drawn into intimate relationship with the kinship groups from which they obtain their wives and assume, because of the principle of reciprocity, obligations to their affinally related (that is, by marriage) kinsmen.

Secondly, because agnates of the same generation are "brothers," they can marry the same women and are, hence, competitors. In other words, the obligations to exchange women (reciprocity) can link the members of affinally related groups to each other more intimately than ties of blood between males of the same lineage. (This can be more readily seen in Figs. 3–5 and 3–6, discussed later, but it can also be partially illustrated here.) If the village shown in Fig. 3–1 were to split in generation V and form two new villages, lineage X would pull apart along the fault line shown. That is, parts of lineage X would end up in each of the two new groups because the affinal (marriage) ties between its members and their wife-givers are stronger than the agnatic ties within the lineage. Individual x_7 and his sister would form a new village with w_3 (and his sister) while x_8, his "brother" (agnate), would remain paired with lineage Y. Lineage X would therefore be represented in both of the two new villages; individuals x_7 and x_8 would "feel" even more remotely related because they now live in different villages, although they would continue to call each other "brother." Finally, the two new villages would again demonstrate the dual organization that characterized generations I and II of the original village of Fig. 3–1. For the sake of simplicity I have shown each married pair with only two children (except in generation III) so that the village remains constant in size, growing only by the addition of new members. In an actual village lineages X and Y might comprise up to 80 percent of the population so that the addition of a few new members such as w_1 would not appreciably alter the dual composition.

In Fig. 3–1, lineage X stands as wife-giver and wife-receiver with respect to the other two lineages. The significance of this relationship cannot be exaggerated in the analysis of Yąnomamö social organization. Its strength derives from the obligations kinship groups have toward each other once they enter into reciprocal marriage exchanges. The wife-giver/wife-receiver relationship is also reflected in the attitudes men have toward their affines, such as brothers-in-law, as opposed to attitudes toward distant agnates. A man is on very intimate terms with his brother-in-law, jokes with him, gives him possessions, and protects him; a man treats an agnate of the same age with great reserve and coolness and tends to be jealous of him. He cannot, for example, directly ask

[5]Kinship ties between patrilineally related kinsmen.

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him to do a favor, whereas he could ask this of a brother-in-law.[6] As shall presently be seen, the dynamics of Yąnomamö social organization originate in the politics of obtaining a wife. Within this context, agnates are competitors and affines are allies. This has an important effect on the manner in which villages fission and form new groups. The point to remember at this juncture is that ties of marriage are in many cases stronger than ties of blood.

I emphasize this because many anthropologists argue from "first principles" that ties of blood are—by definition—more capable of promoting solidarity and amity than ties by marriage. The controversy over "complementary filiation" between E. R. Leach (1957) and M. Fortes (1959), still not satisfactorily resolved, was essentially a debate about the analytical significance of marriage ties. Focusing on only one of the issues and rephrasing the arguments so as to apply to Fig. 3–2, the debate ran something like this: Both Leach and Fortes seemed to agree that in societies having lineal descent groups (lineages), the descent groups would tend to fall apart unless some kind of tie bound the members to each other. That is, lineages X and Y of Fig. 3–2 would, in short, pull away from each other unless they were held together by some special social tie. Fortes argued that this special tie was the solidarity and amity that grew out of the cognatic (see Glossary) kinship ties between the two lineages which arise when individuals marry blood relatives. Looking at generation V, for example, Fortes would argue that lineages X and Y are bound to each other because x_8 and y_8 married women to whom they are related by blood (as FaSiDa and MoBrDa). He argues from first principles that solidarity emanates from the blood ties. Leach, however, states that in generation V the two lineages are bound to each other by obligations to reciprocate goods, services, and women and that the solidarity of the two lineages derives from the affinal ties themselves (shown as "15" and "16" in Fig. 3–2). If we look only at generation V, the argument cannot be resolved, since the data support both arguments equally well, or at least do not convincingly support one rather than the other. I might add that both arguments can be supported by data not given in Fig. 3–2; Fortes' arguments are supported, for example, by the additional fact that Yąnomamö men do not stringently have to avoid their mothers-in-law when they are related to them in the fashion shown in Fig. 3–2, whereas the avoidance taboo is very onerous when a man's mother-in-law is not a blood relative. If, however, attention is focused on the events of generation III and their consequences examined, it can readily be seen that the affinal (marriage) ties in generation V are stronger than some of the agnatic (blood) ties, and the latter break when the village fissions. (This can be even more readily seen in Fig. 3–4 and 3–5, discussed later.) Thus, it cannot be argued that Yąnomamö lineage solidarity derives exclusively from blood ties and "complementary filiation." There is another issue. Structural analyses depend in large measure on a sharp distinction between marriage (affinal) ties and blood (consanguineal) ties. Fortes seems to deny that affinal ties as such exist independently of blood ties, and he has "subsumed" them into his concept of "complementary filiation." If there is no such thing as affinal ties between lineal descent groups, then structural

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 61]

[6] In addition, it is by no means rare for agnates to get into club fights over women. I even have recorded a number of cases of men shooting and killing a "brother" during raids. This happened on two occasions during my first stay in the field, and I have reports of several additional cases obtained from informants who were describing past raids.

Fig. 3–2. Selected genealogies illustrating actual Yanomamö marriage cases.

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analysis of reciprocal marriage exchanges between such groups and the obligations implied in such exchange is seriously hampered. In short, if Yąnomamö marriage exchanges over a number of generations and the kinship basis of village fissioning are examined, the data support Leach's arguments. They do not, however, invalidate Fortes' argument that blood ties create some solidarity, but they do call into question the contention that blood ties by definition, or, rather, on "first principles," account exclusively for the solidarity occurring between lineages.

In summary, Fig. 3–1 represents a number of important features of Yąnomamö social organization. First, people reckon descent through males and are grouped into exogamous, patrilineal lineages. These are called *mashi* by the Yąnomamö, although none of them bear distinctive names.[7] Second, members of these lineages tend to intermarry with the members of a second lineage over a number of generations, being bound to them by obligations to reciprocate women in marriage. This results in a dual organization of kinsmen within the village, whose residents fall into one or the other of the two lineages. Third, new lineages can be incorporated into the village by an extension of marriage ties, potentially bringing about "structural faults" within the lineages of that village. Fourth, men are obliged to marry a woman of a single, specific category, *suabö̈ya*. This category defines a variety of women, two subcategories of which can be translated into the English biological equivalents MoBrDa and FaSiDa. Yąnomamö men prefer to marry women of these subcategories because they are relieved of much of the discomfort of avoiding their mothers-in-law.[8]

The ten partial genealogies shown in Fig. 3–2 show how the Yąnomamö actually marry. The genealogies have been selected with the intention of illustrating how the Yąnomamö reckon relationships between kinsmen in general, and between husband and wife in particular. All ten exemplify prescriptive marriage. They are more or less arranged in decreasing order of correspondence to our own biological concepts of kinship and illustrate the classificatory nature of their kinship system.

The people shown on these genealogies are (or were) real people. Many of the individuals in the examples are related to each other in such ways that all ten of the examples could be drawn as a single, unified genealogy.

The first eight examples are drawn from the village of Patanowä-teri; the last two are from Bisaasi-teri. In case J, for example, the fifth individual of the second generation is Kąobawä. To give a rough idea of the incompleteness of each genealogy, only one of Kąobawä's four marriages is shown and only one of his four children. None of his brothers and sisters are shown either, nor is the fact that he married a MoBrDa indicated.

Case A illustrates the identification procedure to be used in relating the genealogies to the text. There are three generations shown in case A; the first is symbolized by the Roman numeral I, the second, by II, the third, by III. Each individual in each generation is given a number; the number series runs from left to right and begins anew with 1 in each generation. Hence, every individual bears a generation number and a position-within-generation number. Case A illustrates the marriage of individuals III–1 to III–2;

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 63]

[7] *Mashi* means "species," "group," "cluster of similar things," and, in the context of kinship, "that group of people to whom I am related through males;" that is, "patrilineal kinsmen."

[8] I draw attention to the fact that the category is *prescribed*, but within it there are *preferences*. There are very few analyses of societies that have a prescriptive rule within which there are preferences, although Needham has devoted some attention to this interesting phenomenon (1962*a*, 1962*b*, and 1963).

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that is, the marriage of individuals 1 and 2 of the third generation. Although the ten examples are given primarily to illustrate the marriage of individuals of the most recent generation (3 or 4, depending on the number of generations in each example), in some cases additional marriages in ascending generations will be discussed. The point to remember for the time being is that the genealogies should be looked at from the most recent generation; the marriage pattern can be more readily seen in this fashion.

Case A: This exemplifies the *matrilateral cross-cousin* marriage, sometimes called MoBrDa marriage. Here, the Yąnomamö category *suaböya* corresponds exactly with our biological translation to MoBrDa. The man in question (III–1) would have called the woman *suaböya* whether or not he married her. Similarly, she would have addressed him by the term for husband: *bąarөya*.

The marriage of III–1 to III–2 in this case also exemplifies *patrilateral cross-cousin* marriage, for the woman is related to her husband as FaSiDa as well. This is so because individuals II–1 and II–4 are siblings (brother and sister to each other) because their own fathers, in turn, were brothers. (Individual I–2 was an *adopted* brother to I–5, hence the broken sibling line connecting them.) When an individual marries a woman who is simultaneously his FaSiDa and MoBrDa, he is said to marry his *bilateral cross-cousin*. Case A illustrates the preferred form of marriage, for the man does not have to avoid his wife's parents as stringently as he would were they related to him in a different fashion. When a man's father-in-law is his MoBr, he is on extremely intimate terms with him and can even make jokes at his expense. The intimacy of the relationship between a man and his MoBr was brought home to me very indelibly on one occasion. A group of Patanowä-teri men visited Kąobawä, although their two villages were at war. One of the visitors was Kąobawä's wife's brother. After this man rested in a hammock for a few minutes, he got up and found Ariwari, Kąobawä's son. Ariwari was the visitor's sister's son. He played with him in the hammock and hugged him intimately (see Fig. 3–3). Ariwari fell asleep in his arms. This took place in spite of the fact that the visitors were in danger of being killed by other members of Kąobawä's group and narrowly escaped death on their previous visit. (See the section "Division of Labor and Daily Social Life" later in this chapter for a description of the incident.)

Case B: This illustrates the same kind of marriage that took place in Case A, except that the parents of the married people are half-siblings to each other. The Yąnomamö do not distinguish half-siblings from full siblings, so this situation is identical, as far as they are concerned, to the marriage in case A.

Case B also illustrates *sororal polygyny:* III–1 married two women who were related to each other as sisters.

Finally, it should be noted that the father of the man in question married a sister to individual II–3. They stood in wife-giver/wife-receiver relationship to each other and so do their children.

Case C: This illustrates the *patrilateral cross-cousin* marriage, that is, the FaSiDa marriage. Like the MoBrDa marriage, it is preferred because the man does not have to avoid his wife's parents. It is considered to be incestuous for a man to be familiar with his wife's mother if the woman is still sexually active. Hence, he must avoid her. If she is his FaSi, however, incest prohibitions pertaining to that kinswoman would automatically call forth appropriate behavior on his part, and the avoidance taboo is not stringent.

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606 123 [551] The avoidance taboo prohibits a man from saying his mother-in-law's name. My informants would be extremely embarrassed when I would say the name of their mother-in-law while collecting genealogies. Kąobawä, for example, would grin sheepishly and hide his head. Men must also avoid their mothers-in-law physically and should not look at them. If I took a group of people for a ride in my canoe, there would always be considerable shuffling of bodies so that the men could be situated in the canoe as far away from their mothers-in-law as possible.

128 602 595 Finally, case C illustrates another kind of sororal polygyny: Individuals III-1 and III-3 are sisters to each other because their mothers are sisters. (The equation stating that children of siblings of the same sex are themselves siblings extends indefinitely in the case of males, but breaks down in the case of females after two generations. This is because descent is patrilineal.)

128 582 602 *Case D:* This also is a case of FaSiDa marriage: I-2 and I-3 were brothers, so one of the parents of each of the third generation individuals were brother and sister to each other. Hence, III-1 married his FaSiDa.

128 595 602 *Case E:* The marriage of III-1 to III-2 is similar to the marriage in case D, but his marriage to the second wife, III-3, illustrates the use of another kinship equation. She is an actual sister to the first wife, but does not stand in the FaSiDa relationship to her husband. If one of the sisters is FaSiDa, however, then all of them are in Yąnomamö kinship usage.

128 582 602 [601] *Case F:* This illustrates how affinal ties replace consanguineal ties should the two conflict. III-1 can trace a blood tie to his wife, one that would prevent him from marrying her, but the affinal ties between his own father and the father of his wife permit him to marry according to the prescription. Individual III-1 would call all of his father's wives "mother." Hence, his own wife is, technically, MoBrDa.

128 582 587 602 [597] *Case G:* This illustrates a number of marriage rules stated in the preceding examples. I present it as a sort of exercise to reinforce the logic of the Yąnomamö kinship equations given above. Individual II-6 married two brothers, II-5 and II-7, illustrating the *levirate:* the marriage between a man and his brother's widow. Individual II-9 married his FaSiDa (as in case F). Individuals III-3 and III-4 can marry because their fathers were cross-cousins (see case H, below). Individual III-5 married his FaSiDa, as was shown for the similar marriage in case E. Individual IV-1 married two women, each of whom is his FaSiDa. This is so because I-2 and I-4 were adopted brothers, so that their sons (II-2 and II-4) were also siblings. Hence, IV-1 married his FaSiDa (IV-2) and, as in case E, her sister. His second wife is also FaSiDa because her mother (III-6) was a sister to III-2, since their respective fathers (II-9 and II-2) were (adopted) brothers.

128 582 601 602 *Case H:* This illustrates a very powerful marriage rule: The children of men who call each other *shoriwä* (brother-in-law) can marry. Practically speaking, in our kinship terms, the rule is that the children of cross-cousins stand in marriageable relationship to each other. II-2 and II-3 stand in wife-giver/wife-receiver relationship to each other and could exchange sisters in marriage. Their sons stand in the same relationship. Another important feature of Yąnomamö kinship and marriage rules is illustrated here. While III-1 married a woman of the prescribed category, he does not reckon his relationship to her patrilaterally or matrilaterally. That is, she is neither FaSiDa nor MoBrDa, but she is both! This emphasizes the fact that they marry primarily in terms of categories rather than by tracing biological ties, as I have done in the above examples. To the Yąnomamö,

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FaSiDa is the same as MoBrDa, and both are called by the same term, *suaböya*. Hence, to present the above examples as the Yąnomamö would explain them I would not have had to distinguish MoBrDa from FaSiDa, but rather would have had to use just one term; in every case presented, men married their *suaböya*. (This can be seen in the model shown in Fig. 3–1; each male married a woman who was simultaneously FaSiDa and MoBrDa, that is, *suaböya*, to him.)

Cases I and J: These are a little unusual, but I include them to give some idea of both the potentials of the Yąnomamö kinship system and the people who use it.

In case I, individual II–2 is the headman of Lower Bisaasi-teri, Kąobawä's "father." He has considerable authority in the group. He arbitrarily redefined some of his classificatory daughters as sisters *so that his sons could marry their daughters*. Thus, the marriage of IV–1 to IV–2 is now considered to be legitimate because IV–1 could call his wife's mother his mother-in-law (FaSi), since his father redefined her as sister. Otherwise, it would be incest. Most of the people adjusted their kinship usage to fit the circumstances, but Kąobawä, who gave me the details of the manipulation, refused to adjust his own terms. The redefined women in question are his sisters, and he refused to call them FaSi.

I came upon this, and several identical cases, when I learned that the kinship usage between specific individuals did not reflect the equations implied by genealogies. (After I had collected extensive genealogies on four villages, I spent a considerable amount of time collecting kinship terms from specific individuals for every one of the some two thousand individuals included in the genealogies. This served as a cross-check on the genealogies, but uncovered a large number of incestuous and other interesting marriages that I might not have pinpointed otherwise.)

Case J brings out the full potential of the classificatory nature of Yąnomamö kinship. The man (III–1) married his *suaböya* according to the Yąnomamö, although he was not related to her by any blood ties. The justification for the marriage is the fact that III–1 calls all the women to whom his father and his father's brothers are married by the term for mother. Hence, he married his MoBrDa.

THE LINEAGE It was shown in Chapter 1 that villages fission to produce new groups. One of the consequences of this pattern is that in a given area there will be a number of villages whose members can trace genealogical ties to each other because they have common male ancestors. Because of the classificatory nature of Yąnomamö kinship, the interrelated members of two different villages will use kinship terms for each other that imply a closeness of relationship. Thus, Kąobawä has "brothers" in all of the villages that have a common history with his own. These men are usually parallel cousins one or two degrees removed, but brothers in terminological categories. (The lineage to which Kąobawä belongs is shown on Fig. 3–5, discussed later as the *Sha* lineage.)

The Yąnomamö do not name their lineages. I have named all the significant lineages after particular male individuals, usually a long-since-dead male whose generation is the last for which I have meaningful genealogies. Thus, the *Sha* lineage is named after a man called *Shamathiadima*, long dead. He and his brothers left many male descendants who today are distributed in several villages. In the history of the movements of Kąobawä's village, the *Sha* lineage has figured prominently in the affairs of the group. Similarly, the *Hor* lineage is named after a man called *Horeboreböwä*. The *Sha* and *Hor* lineages have a long history of marriage alliance and the living members of these two lineages constitute the greater fraction of the populations of Patanowä-teri, Monou-teri,

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father. He can rejoin them later and again become an active member, but while he lives in a different village he does not participate in the political affairs of that group. Third, the group is *corporate* with respect to the functions of arranging the marriages of the female members. This is the most important single feature of the local descent group: its *function*. The first two characteristics of the group dealt only with the manner in which members can be recruited to the group (birth in the group and coresidence of such kinsmen). In anthropological usage, a corporation is a group of people who share some *estate* and have *rights* and *obligations* with respect to each other and to the estate. There are definite rules for recruiting new members into the corporation. Most studies of primitive corporations have dealt with those societies in which *land* is the estate of the corporation. (See, for example, Fried 1957.) Among the Yąnomamö, land has nothing to do with the functions of the corporate group. Women and rights to dispose of women in marriage constitute the estate of the Yąnomamö corporate groups. Leach is the first anthropologist to draw attention to the analytical importance of this kind of corporation (1961, Chapter 5), although Radcliffe-Brown (1953), in one of the first theoretical discussions of primitive corporations, emphasized the importance of rights over *persons* in some kinds of corporations.

Marriages are arranged by the male members of the local descent group. It cannot be supposed, for example, that the marriage rules automatically dictate the manner in which a woman is disposed in marriage; there are always some negotiations brought about by the situation. For example, a small village may require alliances with larger villages for purposes of defense, and the men of the small village may promise to give daughters to men in the larger village; or there may be a number of men within the village that stand in wife-receiving relationship to the girl, and a decision must be made regarding her ultimate disposition. In some cases a woman's daughters are promised to young men even before they are born. Generally, the girls are near puberty age by the time they are definitely given to a specific male, and they begin cohabiting with the man shortly after the puberty ceremony is over. In some situations a woman must be reassigned to an appropriate mate because her first husband died or abandoned her; or she might run away from a cruel husband and seek refuge among her brothers, bringing about a situation in which they must decide what to do with her.

Women abhor the possibility of being given to men in distant villages, since their fate is much less certain. Men in general are cruel to their wives, and the women rely on the protection of their brothers. A woman who is given to a man in a distant village, therefore, will generally have no brothers to protect her.

A man has considerably more say about the disposition of his daughters when he is young and has immature sons. As the sons grow older, they can overrule the father and insist that the girl be given to a man from some lineage that is likely to reciprocate with a sister. Ideally, women like to be given to men within their natal village. In this fashion the women can remain close to their own kinsmen and rely on the support of their brothers should the husband be particularly cruel. The best arrangement for everyone concerned is for the girl to be given to a man to whom she is related as FaSiDa or MoBrDa in the biological sense. Marriages of this kind exempt the husband from the onerous duty of stringently avoiding his parents-in-law, whereas they at the same time bind the wife-giving and wife-receiving groups more closely together in the system of reciprocities. As Kąobawä stated it, "It is good for groups to exchange women back and

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forth in this fashion. They will be good friends because of it."[10] If the girl marries a man of this category, the probability is high that she will remain in the village with her parents and brothers, since exchanges of this kind keep affinally linked local descent groups bound to each other.

The consequences of the corporate marriage-arranging functions of the local descent group can be most easily seen in the lineage basis for village fissioning, shown in Fig. 3–4. Briefly, the politics of arringing marriages are such that local descent groups of lineage X will pair with similar groups of lineage Y, and largely confine their marriage exchanges to those groups. Putting it more simply, each local descent group of lineage X will pair off with one local descent group of lineage Y, and stand in wife-giver/wife-receiver relationship to that group. When the village fisions, the paired local descent groups will be more strongly bound to each other by marriage ties than each is to the other local descent groups of its own lineage.

VILLAGE FISSIONING Fig. 3–4 presents the structural basis of village fissioning in terms of paired local descent groups. Village A contains two lineages, X and Y. Each lineage has four local descent groups. For simplicity of presentation, only the male

[10] I obtained a nearly identical explanation of reciprocal marriage exchanges of this kind from one of the Makiritare Indians, northern neighbors to the Yąnomamö. The Carib-speaking Makiritare have a prescriptive bilateral cross-cousin marriage rule like the Yąnomamö. My informant told me, in Spanish: "It is necessary for a man to marry his *yeitanade* [their equivalent to the Yąnomamö category of *suabëya*]. In this fashion families become good friends because they marry with each other time after time. When you marry this way, you are good friends with your *suëya* [brother-in-law] and can play and joke with him. You are also good friends with your *uudima* [father-in-law]. If you marry a different way, you must be careful around your *uudima* and respect him."

Fig. 3–4. Distribution of paired local descent groups in village fissioning.



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members are shown. Each group is paired off with an equivalent local descent group of the opposite lineage, giving the four numbered pairs. When village A fissions to form villages B and C, lineages X and Y will break at the weakest points, resulting in the formation of two new villages that have an identical composition: Village B is like village C in size and contains two local descent groups of lineages X and Y; the two local descent groups of each lineage in both new villages are paired with the analogous group of the opposite lineage. Fig. 3–4 can be viewed as a diagram of the physical organization of the village. Thus, in village A the male members of lineage X would tend to live on one side of the village, while the males of lineage Y would live on the opposite side. In actual distribution, then, the village has a "diametric dual organization" (Lévi-Strauss, 1961, Chapter 8). The Yąnomamö, however, do not conceive of the village as having discrete halves. That is, they do not have formal rules enjoining the male members of lineage X to live on one side of the village. There are always residential exceptions to the arrangement shown in Fig. 3–4.

Village B fissions again, resulting in the further breakdown of lineages X and Y. The outcome, villages D and E, is essentially like the outcome of the fission in village A; that is, the resulting new villages are alike in composition, size, and structure. Village C has not fissioned and continues to exist as it did after separating from village B. A comparison of the three villages shown in the last step of Fig. 3–4 will reveal that D, E, and C′ are interrelated villages because patrilineages X and Y occur in each of them. The members of the patrilineages would still continue to call each other brother and sister, although they would be distributed in three different villages. The genealogical ties connecting villages D, E, and C′ have been drawn in to emphasize this relationship.

The reason that lineages break down in this fashion stems from the fact that remote agnatic ties are weaker than the marriage ties that link the paired local descent groups to each other. The strength of the affinal ties between paired local descent groups derives from the obligations of reciprocity in marriage exchanges. Thus, when village B fissioned, local descent group X-1 had stronger ties to Y-1 than it did to X-2. The result was that X-1 and Y-1 separated from X-2 and Y-2 to form their own village, D.[11]

Fig. 3–4 describes the "ideal" pattern of village fissioning. Fig. 3–5 shows the structure and composition of three actual Yąnomamö villages for comparison. As in Fig. 3–4, only the adult males are shown. The incomplete triangles of Upper Bisaasi-teri in Fig. 3–5 signify that the men in question do not live in that village, but they must be included in the diagram to show that their sons live in Upper Bisaasi-teri. The two men actually live in Patanowä-teri, the composition of which is not shown in Fig. 3–5. What has been shown is that the lineages *Hor* and *Sba* extend into Patanowä-teri. In fact, the population of that village is comprised largely of members of these two lineages. See Table 3–1. Only the adult male members of the villages are shown for the three villages in Fig. 3–5, since it is this class of men that dominates the political affairs of the village. For those interested in *all* the genealogical relationships between *all* the members of one of the villages (Lower Bisaasi-teri), see Chagnon, 1966, Figure 2 and Appendix A. As can be seen from Fig. 3–5, each village is characterized by a dual organization of intermarrying lineages. In 1960, Lower Bisaasi-teri and Upper Bisaasi-teri were, in fact, a single village. It can be seen how local descent groups of the *Sba* lineage, for example,

[11]The pair "X-1 and Y-1" is represented on Fig. 3–4 simply by the numeral "1".

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

Fig. 3–5. Actual village fissioning.

separated from each other because of the ties each had to affinally linked descent groups of other lineages. Thus, Lower Bisaasi-teri is comprised essentially of two groups: a local descent group of the *Sha* lineage and a local descent group of the *Tom* lineage. Their members have exchanged women with each other for several generations, creating strong bonds of reciprocal obligations to continue to exchange in the future (Chagnon 1966). Similarly, the local descent groups of the *Sha* lineage in the two remaining villages shown in the figure are linked by affinal ties to other lineages.

Further back in history—1954—Monou-teri also constituted a portion of the village that included Upper and Lower Bisaasi-teri (see Fig. 2–4, Chapter 2). Finally, the three villages shown on Fig. 3–5 constituted a single village with Patanowä-teri about 1940. The fissioning of the original village (and subsequent village fissioning) resulted in the distribution of local descent groups according to pairs, as shown in Fig. 3–4.[12]

Discrepancies in the Marriage Pattern

128
582
621*

I presented in considerable detail the relationship between actual behavior and ideal rules about behavior from a qualitative point of view. This was accomplished by comparing genealogical diagrams describing some actual examples to ideal models of marriage and village fissioning. I will now give some of the quantitative aspects of marriage behavior and the demographic and political bases of the actual marriage pattern.

Table 3–2 shows the distribution of marriage types found in two related villages.

[191]

[12]In some areas of Brazil the pattern of village fissioning is slightly different. There, a local descent group may even establish its own house, separated from the wife-giving/wife-receiving member of the pair by as much distance as several miles. What I have been calling the "village" in this discussion breaks down, in portions of Brazil, into several "part-villages" that are not capable of carrying on an independent social existence. That is, members of the "part-village," the composition of which is essentially a single local descent group of one lineage, must obtain their wives from some other nonlocal group.

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These figures represent a *sample* of marriages in the two villages. The sample consists of all married males who are thirty-five years old or younger. The sample was chosen in this fashion because the analysis of the marriage types depends on genealogical information covering several generations. By selecting only the younger men the analysis can be quite easily undertaken. In Patanowä-teri there were 38 men of this category, many of whom had multiple wives. A man with four wives, therefore, represents four marriages. In Lower Bisaasi-teri only 10 married men were below thirty-five years of age and accounted for the seventeen marriages. If all the men were included, the analysis would be inaccurate because I do not have adequately long genealogies for some of the oldest men. Up to 1940, the villages of Patanowä-teri and Lower Bisaasi-teri were not separate entities; they separated from each other at about that time. Patanowä-teri is a large and powerful village, containing 212 people. Lower Bisaasi-teri, with only 51 people, is militarily dependent on several of its allies.

Four types of marriages are shown in Table 3-2. The term prescriptive refers to the kinds of marriages described in Fig. 3-2. An incestuous marriage is defined as a man marrying a woman of his own patrilineage (or his mother or niece reckoned through his mother's side of the family). Marriages resulting from either alliance or abduction have been lumped into a single category because they represent the recruitment of spouses from outside the group. Finally, a few marriages are unexplainable in terms of Yanomamö kinship and marriage equations; these represent marriages between members of distinct lineages that have recently entered into exchanges with each other.

As can be seen from Table 3-2, there is a major difference between the two villages in the proportion of prescriptive marriages on the one hand and alliance marriages on the other. In short, the Patanowä-teri follow their marriage prescriptions far more rigorously than do the Lower Bisaasi-teri. This is so because Patanowä-teri, a much larger village, does not need to enter into marriage alliances with its neighbors; it is politically and militarily capable of an autonomous existence. Most of the alliance-abduction marriages in Patanowä-teri are, in fact, abductions; in Bisaasi-teri most of them are alliance marriages. Therefore, the relative frequency of alliance-type marriages is much lower for Patanowä-teri than for Lower Bisaasi-teri. This difference in marriage behavior stems from the relative abilities of the two groups to maintain military autonomy in a milieu of chronic warfare, a quality that is largely a function of the size of the group. The members of a militarily vulnerable village will breach the marriage prescriptions in order to establish political alliances with neighboring groups by ceding women to them.

TABLE 3-2
MARRIAGE TYPES IN PATANOWÃ-TERI AND LOWER BISAASI-TERI

	Patanowä-teri	Lower Bisaasi-teri
1. Prescriptive	37	7
2. Incestuous	4	1
3. Alliance and/or abduction	8	9
4. Unexplained	3	0
Totals:	52	17

TABLE 3–3
SEX-RATIO DATA ON SELECTED VILLAGES

	Males	Females	Totals
Upper Bisaasi-teri	37	48	85
Lower Bisaasi-teri	25	26	51
Monou-teri	34	32	66
Reyaboböwei-teri	52	46	98
Mömariböwei-teri	50	46	96
Patanowä-teri	122	90	212
Aikam-teri and Roko-teri	129	103	232
	449	391	840

Table 3–3 gives sex-ratio data on seven groups of Yąnomamö. The first three villages are not truly representative of the population in general, but are included because they have been frequently discussed in the text.

They are not representative because some 15 men from these villages were killed in a single treacherous feast in 1950, a significant fraction of the adult male population. These feasts are not very frequent. The three groups are allied to each other and have been extremely successful at coercing two neighboring Shamatari villages out of women; a surprisingly high proportion of their women come from these allies. As we shall see, they have been successful because of the geographical and historical relationships that characterize the alliance network in this area.

DEMOGRAPHIC BASIS As is apparent, there are more males in the Yąnomamö population than females. This demographic fact results from the practice of selectively killing female babies: *female infanticide.* The Yąnomamö also practice male infanticide, but because of the preference to have a male as their first child, they unknowingly kill more females than males. The Yąnomamö have only three numbers: one, two, and more-than-two. They are, accordingly, poor statisticians. They are quite unaware of the fact that they do kill more female babies, and every time I questioned them about it, they insisted that they killed both kinds—"more-than-two" of both kinds.

A child is killed at birth, irrespective of its sex, if the mother already has a nursing baby. They rationalize the practice by asserting that the new infant would probably die anyway, since its older sibling would drink most of the milk. They are most reluctant to jeopardize the health and safety of a nursing child by weaning it before it is three years old or so, preferring to kill the competitor instead. Kąobawä's wife, Bahimi, killed a newborn male shortly after I began my fieldwork. She later told me, quite tearfully, that it would have taken milk away from Ariwari, Kąobawä's favorite child. Ariwari at the time was over two years old, but Bahimi refused to wean him. Sometimes a child is killed simply because the mother doesn't feel that she can care for it properly and that it would be an inconvenience to have to tend a baby. I once saw a plump, well-fed, young mother eating a large quantity of food that would have been suitable to give to an older infant. Her emaciated, filthy, and nearly starved child—about two years old—kept reaching out for the food. The mother explained that the baby had gotten a bad case of diarrhea some time ago and had stopped eating. As a consequence, her milk dried up. She refused to attempt to feed it other foods because "it did not know how to eat other foods." When

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sexually active females. Some of the teen-age males have homosexual affairs with each other; the females of their own age are usually married. By the time a young man is twenty years old or so he is anxious to display his masculinity, and at that point becomes a competitor for the sexual favors of the village belles—married belles. This causes considerable friction and results in club fighting. (See Chapter 5.)

Still another factor leads to breeches of the marriage rule: chance. In some villages there are disproportionately more males (or females) of the same lineage because of the way in which the group split from a different village. Again, there may be no eligible females when a young man is old enough to marry. His only choice is to seek a wife in a different village. Rerebawä, for example, was forced into this situation. His own village is quite small (about 50 people), but it is dominated numerically by members of his own lineage. Hence, most of the females in the village are related to him as mother, sister, or daughter. The remaining females are married to his older brothers. He therefore came to Upper Bisaasi-teri—an ally of his village—to seek a wife.

Thus, political necessity, cultural practices relating to population control, unequal distribution of women, and chance combine to produce situations in which people cannot follow their prescriptive marriage rules. The factors dealing with politics are the most meaningful in explanations of the discrepancy between Yąnomamö marriage behavior and ideal models of that behavior.

POLITICAL BASIS The importance of politics can be demonstrated by citing a few incidents in the history of several villages and explaining how alliances and hostilities develop over time.

In Chapter 1 I briefly described the political milieu within which Kąobawä's village was situated. The relationships that exist at the present time make considerably more sense when they are viewed in the perspective of the historical events that led up to them. The reasons for village fissions and wars and why particular villages have entered into alliances with each other will now be explored briefly.[14]

The more important political ties currently maintained by Kąobawä's group have antecedents that go back to approximately 1940. At that time the present villages of Patanowä-teri, Monou-teri, and Upper and Lower Bisaasi-teri were one large village (see Fig. 2-8). In 1940, they were known collectively as the Patanowä-teri. To their south was a series of villages whose residents are collectively known as the Shamatari people. The Patanowä-teri were on friendly terms with most of the Shamatari and frequently visited them in order to trade. Just prior to 1940, an epidemic, probably malaria, resulted in the deaths of a number of Patanowä-teri. The Shamatari were suspected of causing the epidemic by practicing harmful magic. The first Shamatari man to visit the village after the epidemic, Ruwahiwä, was treacherous killed by a man who presently lives in Monou-teri; he bashed his head open with an axe. This immediately precipitated a war between the Patanowä-teri and several of the Shamatari villages.

A few years after the war started the Patanowä-teri fissioned into two groups: They relocated their gardens, but remained fairly close to each other geographically. This split was caused by constant bickering within the group and club fights over women. The two new villages thus formed were friendly enough to each other to live in the same

[14] I discussed these relationships in considerable detail in my doctoral dissertation, Chagnon, 1966. The following account is a simplified version.

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Monou-teri, Lower Bisaasi-teri, and Kąobawä's group. All their other neighbors, allied to the victims of the treacherous feast, relentlessly raided them. They were, in short, extremely dependent on Kąobawä's group and the two other villages related to Kąobawä's group.

Kąobawä and his followers have astutely finessed this situation in two ways. First, they have managed to coerce the two Shamatari villages into ceding women without reciprocating an equal number of their own in return. The men who have obtained Shamatari wives have, as well, managed to cut short their period of bride service in the Shamatari village. Conversely, Shamatari men who have been promised women of Kąobawä's group are pressed into very lengthy bride service, sometimes up to three years. Secondly, Kąobawä's group has prevented the two Shamatari allies from re-establishing friendly contacts with the other Shamatari to their southeast by chicane, threat, and intimidation. One of the two Shamatari allies, the Reyaboböwei-teri, has attempted a rapprochement with the Shamatari enemies of Kąobawä's group. In 1965, several months after I had been living in Kąobawä's village, Kąobawä's group managed to stage another treacherous feast for the old enemies by taking advantage of the renewed ties between the Reyaboböwei-teri and the enemies. They learned that the Reyaboböwei-teri planned to invite one of the villages to a feast, so they, along with the Monou-teri, Lower Bisaasi-teri, and Mǫmariböwei-teri, went to the feast in order to ambush the guests. The Reyaboböwei-teri, however, were reluctant to go through with the plan and warned the visitors about it. The visitors were en route to the village when word of the treachery reached them. This had the effect of creating even more difficulties for the Reyaboböwei-teri, for it is highly unlikely that they will succeed in gaining the confidence of their neighbors to the southeast. Nevertheless, some visiting between the groups still continues.[17]

The historical relationships between the villages helps account for the reasons behind contemporary alliance patterns. The discrepancy between marriage rules and actual marriage practice in Lower Bisaasi-teri is a result of the political advantages that group enjoys over one of its allies. It has used this advantage to gain a favorable imbalanced marriage exchange pattern, but one that is only temporary. The Shamatari are also shrewd in their alliance practices, and have succeeded in neutralizing their disadvantages by capitalizing on schisms between Kąobawä's group and Lower Bisaasi-teri. This has been done largely by confining their marriage exchanges to important men in the dominant lineages of Upper and Lower Bisaasi-teri. One of the Shamatari villages, Mǫmaribowei-teri, has restricted its exchanges to Lower Bisaasi-teri and Monou-teri, while completely ignoring Upper Bisaasi-teri. The other Shamatari village has given its women only to Upper Bisaasi-teri. This has resulted in the weakening of ties between the three villages of Upper Bisaasi-teri, Lower Bisaasi-teri, and Monou-teri, whose members are

[17] I plan to use these visiting ties to establish contact with the Shamatari villages in that area, none of which have had contact with outsiders. These uncontacted Shamatari, however, know who I am because I attempted to reach them in 1965. They subsequently sent a message out urging me to visit them, angry because my guides forced me to turn back on my first attempt. In 1966 they even sent an old man to Kąobawä's village by way of Reyaboböwei-teri with an invitation for me to visit them. I had already left Venezuela by that time. Most of the men in the two contacted Shamatari villages tried to prevent me from going by telling horrible tales of the treachery that awaited my visit, describing how the Shamatari will kill me. The truth of the matter is that they know that I will bring the uncontacted Shamatari machetes and axes that might otherwise be given to them. The headman of one of the uncontacted villages has a brother in Mǫmariböwei-teri. He privately conceded that no harm would befall me and offered to take me to visit in 1967. He was, unfortunately, bitten by a snake just before I arrived in March of 1967, and my plans were deferred until 1968.

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related agnatically to each other, and who share a common history. That is, they have lost solidarity as a network of allied villages and, therefore, some of the advantages they enjoyed as wife receivers with respect to the Shamatari villages. They are less able to behave as a single political entity and force the Shamatari to cede women because the Shamatari have given them women in such a way so as to make them competitors with each other. This has also weakened the ties between the two Shamatari villages, which are also related to each other by agnatic ties and common history because each group has linked its political fate with the affairs of different allies. Nevertheless, the two Shamatari villages have, by exchanging women in this fashion, reduced the solidarity of the group of villages that once stood as a unified political bloc that coerced them out of women.

This can be demonstrated in two ways. During the period 1964–1966, Upper and Lower Bisaasi-teri still maintained a common village and entertained visitors as a group. Near the end of this period, after the marriage exchanges had begun to show their effects, they abandoned the common village and began to entertain allies independently of each other. At that time they had together managed to acquire two dozen or so women from the Shamatari while having given or promised only a half-dozen in return. When I returned in 1967, the situation had changed appreciably. There were many more Shamatari men living in the group because they had been given women; that is, the exchanges were more balanced. Moreover, the relationships between Upper and Lower Bisaasi-teri were not as amicable as they had been the previous year; each group was becoming more involved in the obligations it had acquired by entering into marriage exchanges with one of the two Shamatari villages. Just before I returned, there was a club fight involving all of the villages: The Upper Bisaasi-teri and Reyaboböwei-teri fought, as a group, against the Lower Bisaasi-teri and Mõmariböwei-teri; that is, the groups that had entered into marriage exchanges with each other behaved as a unit and fought against their close agnates and erstwhile allies. A group of men from Mõmariböwei-teri forcefully took a woman from the Reyaboböwei-teri, thereby precipitating a challenge to a club fight. The Monou-teri participated in the club fight as well, taking the side of the Mõmariböwei-teri, from whom they had taken several women and to whom they had promised several.

Finally, the political situation altered somewhat. When the alliance first developed between Kąobawĩ's group and the two Shamatari villages in 1960, the political milieu was quite serene. The treacherous feast resulted in a bloody war, but the two Shamatari villages sustained most of the losses. Therefore, the Shamatari allies required the assistance of Kąobawĩ's group more than the latter needed their help, since Kąobawĩ's group had no active wars at the time. In 1965, however, the Monou-teri renewed their old war with the Patanowã-teri and it subsequently involved Kąobawĩ's group and Lower Bisaasi-teri. Only then did they require military assistance from the Shamatari, and only then did the marriage exchanges tend to balance. I will discuss the development of this war in Chapter 4.

Marriage in Yąnomamö society is the result, therefore, of many considerations. It is not merely the outcome of a blind subscription to a rule that enjoins males to marry women of a specific category, for in many cases the political affairs of the group oblige people to give their daughters to men in other villages. The Yąnomamö are practical and enterprising in this regard, particularly those in small villages. The capacity to exist as an independent but small group is greatly enhanced by creating alliances with members

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of other villages—such alliances are stabilized by exchanges of women between the partners, a breach of the prescriptive marriage rules. It is for this reason that such a large discrepancy exists between the ideal behavior and the actual practice, as noted in Table 2.[18]

Division of Labor and Daily Social Life

The daily activities and general social life are not as circumscribed by rules and regulations as would appear from the foregoing discussion. In fact, one first has the impression that chaos rather than order reigns over the daily activities of the village members.[19] Thus, while ideal rules about behavior definitely exist, individuals have a great deal of freedom to manipulate their behavior in such a way that they are not unduly encumbered by them. Most of the run-of-the-mill activities of daily life are not characterized by inflexible prescriptions regarding proper behavior.

MALE-FEMALE DIVISION There are a number of distinctions based on status differences that are important in daily life. Perhaps the most conspicuous and most important is the distinction between males and females.

Yąnomamö society is decidedly masculine. As was discussed earlier, there is a definite preference to have male children, resulting in a higher incidence of female infanticide as opposed to male infanticide. Female children assume duties and responsibilities in the household long before their brothers are obliged to participate in useful domestic tasks. For the most part, little girls are obliged to tend their younger brothers and sisters, although they are also expected to help their mothers in other chores such as cooking, hauling water, and collecting firewood. By the time girls have reached puberty they have already learned that their world is decidedly less attractive than that of their brothers.

As members of local descent groups, girls have almost no voice in the decisions reached by their agnates concerning their marriage. They are largely pawns to be disposed of by their kinsmen, and their wishes are given very little consideration. In many cases, the girl has been promised to a man long before she reaches puberty, and in some cases her husband actually raises her for part of her childhood. In short, they do not participate as equals in the political affairs of the corporate kinship group and seem to inherit most of the duties without enjoying many of the privileges.

Marriage does not enhance the status of the girl, for her duties as wife require her to assume difficult and laborious tasks too menial to be executed by the men. For the most part these include the incessant demands for firewood and drinking water, particularly the former. Women spend several hours each day scouring the neighborhood

[18] Reducing kinship usage to the logical extremes to which the Yąnomamö take it, there really is no discrepancy between theory and practice, except in the case of incest. When new villages enter into contact for the first time, their respective headmen call each other *shoriwä* (brother-in-law). The first exchanges between the groups usually involve the children of these men. The children, of course, stand in marriageable relationship to each other because the children of brothers-in-law can, by the prescriptive definitions, marry.

[19] Many fieldworkers do not begin to see the patterns of behavior until they have spent months of intensive contact with their subjects. I was convinced, after five or six months, that there were almost no guidelines for behavior. A part of the difficulty resulted from the language barrier. The patterns began to emerge only after about six months, and only then could I begin asking pertinent questions about many features of social organization.

fidelity. Many men, however, show their ferocity by meting out serious punishment to their wives for even minor offenses. It is not uncommon for a man to injure his errant wife seriously; and some men have even killed wives.

Women expect this kind of treatment and many of them measure their husband's concern in terms of the frequency of minor beatings they sustain. I overheard two young women discussing each other's scalp scars. One of them commented that the other's husband must really care for her since he has beaten her on the head so frequently!

A woman usually depends for protection on her brothers, who will defend her against a cruel husband. If a man is too brutal to a wife, her brothers may take the woman away from him and give her to another man. It is largely for this reason that women abhor the possibility of being married off to men in distant villages; they know that their brothers cannot protect them under these circumstances. Women who have married a male cross-cousin have an easier life, for they are related to their husbands by cognatic ties of kinship as well as by marriage. Kaobawä, for example, is related to Bahimi as PaSiSo, and their marital relationship is very tranquil by Yąnomamö standards. He does beat Bahimi on occasion, but never cruelly. It is considered good to beat a wife every once in a while just to show your concern for her.

A young man in Monou-teri shot and killed his wife a few years before I conducted my fieldwork. Even while I was there, a man in one of the villages shot his wife in the stomach with a barbed arrow. Considerable internal injury resulted when the arrow was removed. The missionaries had her sent out by airplane to the Territorial capital for surgery. Her wound had gotten infected, and the girl was near death by the time the incident came to their attention. Another man chopped his wife on the arm with a machete; the missionaries in that village feared that the woman would lose the use of her hand because some of the tendons to her fingers were severed. A fight involving a case of infidelity took place in one of the villages just before I left the field. The male culprit was killed in the club fight, and the recalcitrant wife had both her ears cut off by her enraged husband. A number of other women had their ears badly mutilated by angry husbands. The women wear sticks of cane in their pierced ear lobes; these are easily grabbed by the husband. A few men jerked these so hard that they tore their wives' ear lobes open.

It is not difficult to understand, then, why Yąnomamö women in general have such a vindictive and caustic attitude toward the external world. By the time a woman is thirty years old she has "lost her shape" and has developed a rather unpleasant disposition. Women tend to seek refuge and consolation in each other's company, sharing their misery with their peers.

A woman gains a measure of respect when she becomes old. By then she has adult children who care for her and treat her kindly. Old women also have a unique position in the world of intervillage warfare and politics. They are immune from the incursions of raiders and can go from one village to another with complete disregard for personal danger. In this connection they are employed as messengers and, on some occasions, as the recoverers of bodies. If a man is killed near the village of an enemy, an old woman from the slain man's village is permitted to recover his body.

Still, the women have one method by which they can exercise a measure of influence over village politics. All women fear being abducted by raiders and always leave the village with this anxiety at the back of their minds. Women always bring their

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When Kaobawä's group travels, Ariwari emulates his father by copying his activities on a child's scale. For example, he erects a temporary hut from small sticks and discarded leaves and plays happily in his own camp (see Fig. 3–7). His sisters, however, are pressed into more practical labor and help their mother do useful tasks. Still, the young girls are given some freedom to play at being adults and have their moments of fun with their mothers.

But a girl's childhood ends sooner than a boy's. The game of playing house fades imperceptibly into a constant responsibility to help mother. By the time a girl is ten years old or so, she has become an economic asset to the mother and spends a great deal of time working. Little boys, by contrast, spend hours playing among themselves and are able to prolong their childhood into their late teens if they so wish. By that time a girl has married, and may even have a child or two.

A girl's transition to womanhood is obvious because of its physiological manifestations. At first menses (*yakëmou*) Yąnomamö girls are confined to their houses and hidden behind a screen of leaves. Their old cotton garments are discarded and replaced by new ones manufactured by their mothers or by older female friends. During this week of confinement, the girl is fed by her relatives; her food must be eaten by means of a stick, as she is not allowed to come into contact with it in any other fashion. She must also scratch herself with another set of sticks. The Yąnomamö word for menstruation translates literally as "squatting" (*ro*), and that fairly accurately describes what pubescent females (and adult women) do during menstruation. Yąnomamö women do not employ tampons; they simply remain inactive during menstruation, squatting on their haunches most of the time. After her puberty confinement, a girl is eligible to begin life as a wife and take up residence with her husband.

Males, on the other hand, do not have their transition into manhood marked by a ceremony. Nevertheless, one can usually tell when a boy is attempting to enter the world of men. The most conspicuous sign is his anger when others call him by his name. When the adults in the village cease using his personal name, the young man has achieved some sort of masculine adult status. Young men are always very touchy about their names and they, more than anyone else, take quick offense when hearing their names mentioned. The Yąnomamö constantly employ teknonymy when a kinship usage is ambiguous. Thus, someone may wish to refer to Kaobawä in a conversation, but the kinship term appropriate to the occasion might not distinguish him from his several brothers. Then, Kaobawä will be referred to as "father of Ariwari." However, when Ariwari gets older, he will attempt to put a stop to this in an effort to establish his status as an adult. A young man has been recognized as an adult when people no longer use his name in teknonymous references. Still, the transition is not abrupt, and it is not marked by a recognizable point in time.

Finally, the children differ from adults in their susceptibility to supernatural hazards. A great deal of Yąnomamö sorcery and mythological references to harmful magic focuses on children as the target of malevolence. Yąnomamö shamans are constantly sending evil spirits (*Hekura*) to enemy villages. There, they secretly attack and devour the vulnerable portion of the childrens' souls (*nowadi*), bringing about sickness and death. These same shamans spend an equal amount of time warding off the dangerous spirits sent by their enemies. Children are vulnerable because their souls are not firmly established within their physical beings, and can wander out of the body almost at will. The

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New individuals are incorporated into the community by an extension of kinship ties. Unless one is incorporated into the village in this fashion, there is no basis for social behavior vis-à-vis others, for the kinship system defines one's role in society. An orphaned teen-ager joined Kąobawä's group shortly before I began my fieldwork. He was from a distant Shamatari village and had no blood relatives in Kąobawä's group. He established his position in the community by calling Kąobawä "father." This defined his relationship to all of Kąobawä's kinsmen as well. As an exercise in kinship, I had the young man give me his relationship term for everyone in the village. He not only had specific terms for every member of the group, but he had also extended them to all the residents of Lower Bisasi-teri and Monou-teri as well, since Kąobawä was related to these people. In short, the boy learned how Kąobawä was related to all the members of three different villages and logically extended his own assumed relationship to Kąobawä outward to the others; and he behaved toward them accordingly: He avoided women he called mother-in-law and refrained from sexual activities with women he called sister.

To emphasize the fact that the kinship categories do not always correspond to biological relationships, let me give an example of an incestuous marriage. Kąobawä's younger brother, Shiimima, recently (1966) took a young girl for his wife, outraging most of the community because he "behaved toward her as brother" before the marriage. The girl's mother had been abducted some twenty years earlier from a distant village and was given to a man who stood in a father relationship to Kąobawä and Shiimima. Thus, both Kąobawä and Shiimima called the abducted woman "mother" and called her daughter "sister." The abducted woman's husband died of malaria; after this, she had a number of temporary affairs with other men before being officially taken as a wife by another man in the village. Her daughter is the issue of a temporary affair she had with the headman of Mahekodo-teri, the group that gave Kąobawä refuge after the treacherous feast in 1950. She is, therefore, biologically unrelated to Kąobawä and Shiimima, but since they behaved toward her as brothers, Shiimima's marriage to her is a blatant case of incest. The matter was as disgusting to my informants as it would have been had Shiimima married his own biological sister.

There are many important kinship distinctions in Yąnomamö social life, but the one between relatives by marriage and agnatic relatives should particularly be emphasized. This distinction is at the basis of Yąnomamö political behavior and village fissioning. This point was emphasized in the discussion of village fissioning and marriage rules in the first section of this chapter.

One of the most important characteristics of affinal ties is that they are capable of growing in strength over time because they can be solidified and reinforced by marriage exchanges between the groups. Ties between agnates, on the other hand, tend to weaken over time. For example, Kąobawä's local descent group could renew its friendship to similar affinally related groups in the village of Patanowä-teri by entering into marriage exchanges with them once again. There is no way, however, in which his own descent group could reinforce or strengthen the agnatic ties with the local descent groups of the *Sha* lineage in Patanowä-teri. By marrying into the affinally related Patanowä-teri descent groups, Kąobawä's group would enter into direct competition with agnatic counterparts in that village, further straining the relationships between the two communities.

There is another way of looking at this situation. Men who are related to each other as agnates (for example, brothers and parallel cousins) get along well with each

602 other when they are children and young men. As time passes and these men become old
571 enough to seek wives, members of the groups to which they belong enter into competi-
602 tion with each other. The men themselves are under some pressure to display their per-
571 sonal autonomy, and they treat each other with considerable reserve as they get older.
578 They cannot boss each other around or expect many favors from one another. Kąobawī, for example, cannot ask his adult brothers to perform menial tasks for him. This is because each man—particularly those men who compete for the same women—attempts to convince all others that he is capable of ferocity. The more remote the genealogical distance, the greater is the reserve with which mature agnates treat each other. That is, distant parallel cousins would behave toward each other with considerably more reserve than would actual brothers, although the men in question are all related to each other terminologically as brothers. If such men live in different villages, their mutual relationships are even more reserved when they meet.

602 The relationship between men who call each other brother-in-law, however, grows
607 more intimate as the men get older. They can play and joke with each other, whereas
571 agnates cannot, for they are not competitors and are not constrained to exhibit their
581 fierceness to each other. They can cement their relationships to each other by merely
582 promising to give their daughters to each other's sons. They can ask favors of each other, expecting them to be done without complaint.

602 Kąobawī's relationships to two men in his village illustrate the distinction be-
[601] tween agnates and affines. Both men joined his group from the village of Patanowī-teri some time after Kąobawī's group separated from the village. One of the men, Nadesiwī, is related to him agnatically: they call each other "brother" because their fathers were half-brothers. Nadesiwī is in Kąobawī's local descent group, but is not quite on a par [613] with the other members in the political affairs of the group. The other men in the [581] group—Kąobawī and his closer brothers—put pressure on Nadesiwī to give his only [582] daughter to a man in a distant Shamatari village for the purpose of stabilizing an alliance. This was a considerable sacrifice for him to make, as his daughter, after the [591] completion of bride service, will have to live in her husband's village—Nadesiwī will [604] have no coresident son-in-law to provide him with meat when he gets old. Kąobawī and Nadesiwī treat each other with respect and great reserve and do not ask each other for favors.

602 The other man, Kumamawī, is Bahimi's actual brother; Kąobawī is related to
607 him, therefore, as an affine as well as by cognatic kinship ties. That is, they are first
[594] cross-cousins by blood and also related to each other by marriage. Kumamawī is a
[613] frequent visitor in Kąobawī's house and enthusiastically executes the numerous tasks that Kąobawī asks of him. They are members of different local descent groups, but their groups are related to each other by marriage exchanges that go back several generations. In short, Kąobawī's personal ties to his brother-in-law are warmer and friendlier than his relationship to one of the members of his own local descent group.

Daily Activities

361 Kąobawī's village is oval-shaped. His house is located among those of his
342 agnatic kinsmen; they occupy a continuous arc along one side of the village. Each of the

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The beleaguered partner may be obliged to remain in the village of his host for a year or longer, approximately the length of time required to establish a new plantation and productive base from which an independent existence is possible. Twice in the recent history of Kąobawä's group they were driven from their gardens by more powerful enemies and were forced to take refuge in the village of an ally. In each case the group remained with the ally for a year or so, moving away only after their new garden began producing. In both cases, the hosts demanded and received a number of women from Kąobawä's group without reciprocating in kind, a prerogative they exercised from their temporary position of strength. The longer the group takes advantage of a hosts' protection, the higher is the cost in terms of women, so visitors always make an attempt to establish their gardens as quickly as possible and move into them as soon as they begin producing. Without allies, therefore, the members of a village would either have to remain at their single garden and sustain the attacks of their enemies or disband into several smaller groups and join larger villages on a permanent basis, losing many of their women to their protectors. The jungle simply does not produce enough wild foods to sustain larger groups, and the threat of warfare is such that smaller groups would soon be discovered by their enemies and exterminated.

Because of the ever-present risk of being driven from one's garden, therefore, no Yąnomamö village can continue to exist as a sovereign entity without establishing alliances with other groups. Warfare is attended by a bellicose ideology which asserts that strong villages should take advantage of weaker ones and coerce them out of women; to prevent this, all villages should therefore behave as if they were strong. Thus, the military threat creates a situation in which intervillage alliance is desirable, but at the same time spawns a military ideology that inhibits the formation of such alliances: Allies need but cannot trust each other. They are obliged to behave aggressively in order to display their respective strength.

Alliances between villages are the product of a developmental sequence that involves casual trading, mutual feasting, and finally the exchange of women. The most intimate allies are those who, in addition to trading and feasting, exchange women. Any developing alliance may stabilize at the trading or feasting stage without proceeding to the woman-exchange phase. These are weak alliances, but serve to limit the degree of war that might possibly obtain between the villages so related: The Yąnomamö tend to avoid attacking those villages with which they trade and feast, unless some specific incident, such as the abduction of a woman, provokes them. Allies that are linked by trade and feasting ties, for example, rarely accuse each other of practicing harmful magic. Allies bound to each other by affinal kinship ties, however, are more interdependent because they are under obligation to each other to continue to exchange women. It is, in fact, by the exchange of women that independent villages extend kinship ties to each other.

Members of allied villages are usually reluctant to take the final step in alliance formation and cede women to their partners, for they are always worried that the latter might not reciprocate as promised. This attitude is especially conspicuous in smaller villages, for their larger partners in defense pressure them into demonstrating their solidarity by ceding women; the strong can and do coerce the weak in Yąnomamö politics. The weak, therefore, are compelled to exaggerate their strength by bluff and intimidation and by attempting in general to appear to be stronger, militarily, than they really are, thereby hoping to convince their partners that they are equals, capable of an independent

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existence. By so doing, they also inform their partners that any attempt to coerce them out of women will be met with the appropriate reaction, such as a chest-pounding duel or club fight. Nevertheless, each ally expects to gain women in the alliance and enters it with this in mind; and each hopes to gain more women than it cedes in return.

Hence, in order for an occasional nervous meeting of groups of men from different villages to evolve into a stable intervillage alliance based on the reciprocal exchange of women, the long and difficult road of feasting and trading must be traversed. Suspicion must give way to relative confidence, and this must develop into reciprocal feasting during the dry season. Only then has the intervillage relationship reached a point where the partners begin ceding women to each other; and even then, it is done reluctantly.

This is, however, only the ideal pattern in the development of an alliance. Rarely does it develop far enough to reach the stage where women change hands, particularly if the two villages concerned are of approximately the same military strength. Fights and arguments over women or food develop, and the principals withdraw temporarily on semihostile terms, perhaps attempting a rapprochement sometime in the future. Or, if the principals are obviously different military potential, the stronger of the two will coerce its weaker partner into ceding women early in the alliance development, taking advantage of its own military strength, thus altering the course of alliance development in the opposite direction.

Whatever the specific developmental sequence leading to the woman-exchange phase, the milieu within which these developments take place is not conducive to the establishment of warm ties of friendship. Each of the principals attempts to demonstrate his own sovereignty in order to convince the other that he does not really require political alliance to keep his enemies in check. This is accomplished by bragging about past military victories and fierceness in past club fights and chest-pounding duels, and by insinuating that one's group is always on the verge of exploding into a force so great that no combination of allies could overcome its terrible might. The smaller the village and more obvious its vulnerability, the greater is the pressure to insinuate or to demonstrate this potential.

Political maneuvering in this milieu is both a tricky and potentially hazardous undertaking. Each principal in the negotiation must establish the credibility of his own threats, while discovering the point at which his partner's bluff will dissolve abruptly into action; he must discover the point beyond which he must not goad his ally, lest he himself is prepared to suffer the possibly violent outcome. It is a politics of brinkmanship, a form of political behavior in which each negotiator is compelled to expose his opposite's threats as bluffs at the risk of inciting him to violence—a club fight, immediately and honorably, or, later and treacherously, a feast in which the hosts descend on their guests to kill their men and abduct their women.

Trading and Feasting in Alliance Formation

Because an ally is not beyond taking advantage of his weaker partner, especially when the alliance is just developing, there is very little in the way of natural attraction to encourage the two groups to visit each other. Considerations of pride and canons of ferocity preclude obvious attempts to develop stable and predictable alliances and military

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a local shortage of the item in order to have to rely on an ally for it, giving sufficient cause to visit them.

Often the specialization is less individualized than in the case of clay pot manufacture. Kąobawä's group, for example, exports cotton yarn to one ally, but imports it from another. The exported cotton frequently is brought back in the form of manufactured hammocks, the importer merely contributing labor to the process. In some cases the shortages are merely seasonal; Kąobawä's group may import cotton from a particular ally at one time of the year, but export it at another. Most of the trade, however, involves items that are readily manufactured by or raised by any group, underscoring the fact that trade is the stimulus to visit. Food does not enter the trading system, although hospitality dictates that it must be given to friendly groups. Occasionally, a village will run short of plantains because of a particularly long hot spell, and its members may visit an ally to borrow food to last a week or so. This hospitality is usually reciprocated, but it is not a part of the trading network.

Alliances between villages may stabilize at any one of three points: sporadic reciprocal trading, mutual feasting, or reciprocal women exchange. These are cumulative levels in the sense that the third phase implies the first two: Allies that exchange women also feast and trade with each other. Likewise, allies that merely feast together also trade, but do not exchange women. At the lower end of this scale of solidarity lie those villages with which one fights to kill, while at the upper end are those villages from whom one's group has recently separated. Frequently, the scale is circular rather than linear: A village's mortal enemy is the group from which it has recently split. By way of example, Kąobawä's group trades sporadically with the Makorima-teri, Daiyari-teri, Widokaiya-teri, Mahekodo-teri, and Iyawei-teri. These are fairly weak alliances and even permit limited fighting. His group has more intimate ties with the Reyaboböwei-teri and Mǫmariböwei-teri, with whom it feasts regularly. The alliance with the Reyaboböwei-teri has even reached the point at which they are exchanging women with each other. Finally, at the other end of the scale, Kąobawä's group is at war with the Iwahikoroba-teri, Möwaraoba-teri, and Patanowä-teri. The first two of these groups are historically unrelated to Kąobawä's group, although they have a common history with two of his staunchest allies, the Reyaboböwei-teri and Mǫmaribowei-teri, from whom they separated in the past. The Patanowä-teri are related to Kąobawä and his followers, as was shown in Chapter 3. Nevertheless, they are bitter enemies and are at present raiding each other.

Although there is no rigid geographical correlation of the village settlement pattern to the degree of alliance solidarity, neighboring villages usually are at least on trading terms and are not actively conducting war on each other. Should war develop between neighbors, one of the two principals will abandon its site and move to a new location. Whether the ties between neighboring villages will be one of blood, marriage exchange, reciprocal feasting, or casual trading depends on a large number of factors, particularly on village size, current warfare situation with respect to more distant groups, and the precise historical ties between the neighboring villages. Whatever the nature of the ties between neighbors, each strives to maintain its sovereignty and independence from the others.

The Yąnomamö do not openly regard trade as a mechanism the ulterior function of which is to bring people repeatedly together, thus establishing an amicable basis from

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he was not enthusiastic about going on the raid, despite the fact that he lectured the younger members of the raiding party about their overt reluctance and cowardice. He was older, however, and had to display the ferocity that adult men are supposed to show. In short, although Hukoshikuwä probably had very little desire as an individual to participate in the raiding, he was obliged to do so by the pressures of the entire system. He could ill afford to remain neutral, as his very own kinsmen–even Kąobawä–implied by word and action that it was disgusting for him not to avenge the death of his brother; and some of his kinsmen in other villages openly accused him of cowardice for not chasing the raiders when they shot Damowä. Again, his erstwhile allies, when they complained about having to feed him and his relatives, were blunt and discourteous. The Shamatari allies even managed to demand a number of women from Hukoshikuwä's group in payment for girls they had given them earlier, when the Monou-teri were superordinate in the alliance pecking order. In short, if Hukoshikuwä failed to put on a show of ferocity and vindictiveness, it would not be long before his friends in allied villages would be taking even greater liberties and demanding more women. Thus, the system worked against him and demanded that he be fierce. Since his own group was small, it had to protect its sovereignty even more rigorously, or be absorbed by a greedy ally whose protection would be tendered at the price of women.

Hukoshikuwä and his raiders did not locate the Patanowä-teri on this raid, although they searched for over a week. They knew it would be difficult to find them in the rainy season, largely because they would have to take many detours around impassable swamps. It was with this in mind that they brought their larger-than-usual supply of plantains.

The war was still being conducted, but on a lesser scale, when I returned to Monou-teri a year later. They had managed to kill two Patanowä-teri and abduct two women. The Patanowä-teri only killed one Monou-teri, the headman. Hence, the Monou-teri, at least for the time being, came out ahead. The Patanowä-teri will not cease raiding them until they kill at least one more Monou-teri, but then the Monou-teri will be obliged to avenge this death when it occurs.

There will probably be a respite to the raiding because the Patanowä-teri group fissioned and subsequently lost a significant fraction of their numbers. The Monou-teri have completed their move to the new garden and now live there. If the raiding stops, they will be able to live alternatively between their two gardens at any season. Otherwise, they can only occupy their old site in the peak of the wet season. Having two gardens makes them more independent of their allies, and they can again be aggressive in their political dealings with them. Since they have exchanged women with one of their Shamatari allies and are now living only a half-day's journey from them, they most likely will bind their political fate to the fate of this ally. Their relationships to the two Bisaasi-teri groups, on the other hand, will probably grow cool. Already, the Monou-teri have taken sides with their Shamatari allies in club fights against the Upper Bisaasi-teri, and they still resent the fact that the Lower Bisaasi-teri forcefully took one of the abducted Patanowä-teri women away from them. Despite the fact that the Monou-teri share a common history and common blood with the two Bisaasi-teri groups, they are now entering into a political situation that frequently leads such related groups to mutual hostilities.

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